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This dissertation provided a method of estimating the potential return on investment
(ROI) that could be achieved if operators were to adopt the readily available controlled
flight into terrain (CFIT) avoidance technology more broadly. Previous research
explored the costs and benefits of different safety initiatives but did not evaluate from an
operators’ perspective. For the operators, a private ROI that excludes societal costs and
benefits was therefore considered the suitable metric. For the rotorcraft industry, the ROI
estimation methodology was not readily available, and this study sought to fill that gap.
The purpose of this study was to estimate the potential ROI by determining the costs
associated with the outcomes of CFIT-accidents, the costs of adopting the technology, the
current accident rate, the benefits expressed as costs avoided through a reduction in the
number of accidents, and application of the appropriate ROI formula.
The dissertation was conducted as a mixed method study that used qualitative data
from historical CFIT-related accident reports to identify the accident outcomes and
estimate the associated accident costs plus the available quantitative data to estimate the
CFIT-avoidance technology adoption costs. The accident cost categories were based on
categories used in airline research and modified for the rotorcraft industry. Using the
formula, ROI = Net benefits divided by safety technology adoption costs, ROI values
iv

were generated in multiple iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation. The net benefits
were evaluated as the difference between the potential accident costs avoided with a
reduction in CFIT accidents and the technology adoption costs.
The simulation results for the three rotorcraft categories showed that the turbinesingle would experience the highest ROI, followed by the piston category and the twinturbines. When all rotorcraft categories were considered, the ROI was positive but could
turn negative if the technology adoption costs grew by a factor of more than three. The
broad range in the ROI values for both the piston and single-turbine categories were
largely driven by the high variation of the individual cost categories, especially the direct
costs: occupant death and injuries, aircraft damage, and leasing costs.
From the results of the study, it was recommended that CFIT-avoidance
technology should be more broadly adopted by piston and single-turbine rotorcraft
operators. For twin-turbines, the adoption should be evaluated against the impact of the
regulatory changes for helicopter air ambulance (HAA) operations, which may reduce the
number of accidents and generate a positive ROI before further action from operators.
Future research should focus on validating the methodology by using it as a starting point
for evaluating the ROI for safety initiatives that have already been implemented, whether
technology or operational programs. The industry should also improve the methodology
by defining or proposing better processes for estimating rotorcraft accident costs,
especially indirect costs estimated to be the of the same magnitude as the direct costs.
The rotorcraft industry should find ways to make costs data, such as accident
investigation costs, more accessible in order to apply the ROI estimation methodology to
achieve more accurate results.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In his commentary in the America Helicopter Society (AHS) International’s
March/April 2015 issue of Vertiflite, the long-term Executive Director, Michael
Hirschberg, reiterated the need for civil helicopter operators to adopt technologies that
are certified, readily available, and affordable in order to mitigate most of the top safety
issues. He emphasized five core technologies: (1) Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning
Systems (EGPWS)/ Helicopter Terrain Awareness Warning Systems (HTAWS), (2)
flight data monitoring devices, (3) helicopter operations monitoring program systems, (4)
radar altimeters for light helicopters, and (5) onboard aircraft performance monitoring
and calculating systems. As an industry leader, he was emphasizing the findings of the
study by the European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) which listed the 15 “highly
promising” technologies that could potentially mitigate most of the safety issues facing
the helicopter industry (National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR), 2014).
The Specialist Team Technology (ST Technology), a sub-team of the European
Helicopter Safety Implementation Team, was created to assess the potential of different
technologies to mitigate the safety issues identified by the European Helicopter Safety
Analysis Team (EHSAT). The EHSAT analyzed more than 300 accidents and identified
the different accident / incident causes and contributing factors referred to as the Standard
Problem Statements (SPSs). The team developed a tool and used it to link the different
technologies to the SPSs, and using a scoring or rating system, determined the most
advantageous technology for each safety issue. Two rating elements, Impact and
Applicability were used. Impact was a measure of how well the given technology could
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mitigate the specific SPS, and Applicability was a measure of whether the said
technology could be utilized for a specific SPS at its current technology readiness level
and cost. Due to the large number of SPSs identified, only the Top 20 were considered.
The technologies were rated as: slightly promising, moderately promising, and highly
promising. According to the National Aerospace Laboratory (2014), of the 15 highly
promising technologies, five are promising in mitigating the mission risk presented by
terrain or obstacles:
i) Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System / Terrain Awareness and Warning
System (EGPWS/TAWS)


System provides warnings of obstacle hazards such as ground and towers.

ii) Laser Radar Obstacle and Terrain Avoidance System


System uses an eye-safe laser capable of detecting objects as thin as wires,
thus making it useful for wire strike prevention.

iii) Digital Map


System displays digital maps with elevation and obstacle information.

iv) Passive Tower-based Obstacle Collision Avoidance System


Units located on utility and power line towers detect air traffic entering a
predefined warning zone and activate warning lights to illuminate the
tower and do not require any installations in the helicopter.

v) Radar Altimeter for Altitude Measurement


System for small helicopters, consisting of one single unit containing both
transmitter and receiver antennas as well as processing unit.
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Though these technologies are readily available to operators, adopting them
requires the investment of additional resources beyond the initial aircraft acquisition costs
for aircraft already in service. For operators, the decision to invest resources in safety
relies heavily on their ability to build a credible business case for it, thus the need for an
evaluation of the return on investment (ROI) or cost-benefit analysis.
As the competitiveness in the global business environment continues to intensify,
executives are evaluating the contribution of their individual products, services, and
programs to the overall corporate fiscal performance. The executives’ goal is to identify
factors that impede or enhance productivity and growth. Safety performance and
management has been identified as a critical factor to an organization’s reliability,
reputation, operational effectiveness, fiscal performance, and competitiveness
(Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, & Vázquez-Ordás, 2009; Flight Safety Foundation,
2012). According to Porter and Kramer (2006), in the automotive industry, Volvo has
actively chosen to make vehicle safety a central element of its competitive position, while
Toyota has done the same with the environmental safety benefits of its hybrid
technology. Rotorcraft manufacturers, through the introduction of different safety
technologies, have sought to gain the same competitive advantage over their counterparts
while reducing the occurrence of aircraft incidents and accidents. The adoption of these
technologies is therefore important to the manufacturers and the industry as a whole.
Rotorcraft Safety
Rotorcraft safety continues to be a major concern for the aviation industry. The
importance of addressing this subject is highlighted by the National Transportation Safety
Board’s (NTSB) action of placing the enhancement of public helicopter safety on its
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Most Wanted List of 2015 (NTSB, 2015). The International Helicopter Safety Team
(IHST) was set up in late 2005 by government regulators, manufacturers, and helicopter
operators with the goal of reducing the number of global helicopter accidents by 80
percent by 2016 and eventually to zero (U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team,
2011).
Controlled flight into terrain. A Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is defined
as an accident where an aircraft in good working condition, while still under the control
of the crew, is unintentionally flown into terrain, man-made obstacles, or water, with no
prior awareness on the part of the crew of the impending collision (Ishihara, 2005). In a
study of the helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) CFIT accidents between
1992 and 2004, Ishihara (2005) observed that 84% of the accidents occurred during night
time, 58% in visual meteorological conditions (VMC), 80% during the cruise phase, and
79% involved terrain. The reduction of CFIT accidents requires the industry
understanding the extent of the problem, proposing mitigation solutions, and adopting the
said solutions.
A 2015 White Paper was prepared for the rotorcraft industry by the Helicopter
Association International (HAI), the AHS International, General Aviation Manufacturers
Association (GAMA), and Aircraft Electronics Association as a proposal to modify the
requirements of Part 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 27 single-engine instrument
flight rules (IFR) certification. The team observed that during the period between 2001
and 2013, Part 27 single-engine helicopters across the world were involved in 194
accidents related to inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) or
CFIT with 133 resulting in fatalities. Over the same period, multi-engine Part 27 or Part
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29 rotorcraft worldwide were involved in 54 accidents related to IMC, CFIT, or IFR with
40 resulting in fatalities. According to the NTSB, 60 percent of all CFIT accidents are
fatal (Sandel Avionics, 2012).
The U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team (JHSAT) (2011) has observed
that in the 523 U.S. registered helicopter accidents occurring in calendar years 2000,
2001, and 2006, a pilot’s decision to continue Visual Flight Rules (VFR) when
indications of deteriorating weather were presented frequently resulted in the pilot
entering inadvertent IMC. Accidents that occurred after continued flight in such
marginal or deteriorated weather conditions were commonly a result of a collision with
obstacles or terrain. When operating in a low altitude environment, the inability to detect
wires as well as the loss of situational awareness was also observed as a problem that
resulted in inadequate clearance from the ground and strikes to trees and obstacles in the
rotorcraft’s flight path.
In a 2006 report, the NTSB concluded that for 17 of the 55 accidents it
considered, the pilots might have avoided terrain if TAWS was installed. It further
concluded that the use of TAWS would enhance the safety of emergency medical
services (EMS) operations in night and adverse weather conditions by helping prevent
CFIT accidents. The NTSB issued the Safety Recommendation A-06-15, proposing the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) require EMS operators to install TAWS and
ensure their flight crews are capable of using it. In 2008, the FAA published Technical
Standards Order C194, Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System, in readiness
for the rulemaking process for EMS TAWS requirements to start (NTSB, 2009).
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By the end of 2008, the NTSB realized the safety recommendation on TAWS
would not be adequate as the number of accidents began to rise again after the reduction
achieved between 2004 and 2007. For flight safety improvements to be realized, a final
rule mandating the installation and use of TAWS in air medical services flights would
therefore be required. In April 2009, before the House Committee of Transportation and
Infrastructure, then FAA Director of Flight Standards, John Allen, announced that the
agency had initiated the formal rule-making process to address this issue (FAA, 2009a).
In 2012, the FAA released guidance outlining the technical requirements for the
installation of TAWS on all HEMS aircraft, now more commonly referred to as
helicopter air ambulance (HAA), and in 2014 the final rule was released (FAA, 2014a).
In February 2014, the FAA made amendments to the Title 14 CFR Parts 91, 120,
and 135 introducing new requirements for the HAA operators, commercial helicopters,
and Part 91 helicopter operations. Under Part 135 rotorcraft operations, each HAA
rotorcraft is to be equipped with a radio altimeter, HTAWS, and flight data monitoring
system. Additionally, the pilots must be instrument rating holders and can demonstrate
their capability of maneuvering the aircraft safely out of inadvertent instrument
meteorological weather conditions (FAA, 2014a). In May 2014, the FAA released
Advisory Circulars 27-1B Change 4 and 29-2C Change 4 to formalize the requirements
for the installation of the equipment on all HAA operations aircraft (FAA, 2014b; FAA,
2014c).
According to the FAA, by 2014 there were 75 air ambulance companies operating
approximately 1,515 helicopters in the United States. Since 2004, the FAA has been
promoting different initiatives to reduce HAA accidents after determining that 62
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accidents, which resulted in 125 fatalities between 1991 and 2010 could have been
mitigated by adopting the technologies mandated in 2014. This number did not include
accidents involving non-HAA commercial helicopters. From 2011 through 2013, a total
of 16 helicopter accidents resulting in 39 fatalities occurred (FAA, 2014d). The number
of accidents is an indication of why the FAA and the IHST emphasize the need for a
faster adoption of different safety technologies within the whole industry.
Return on Investment (ROI)
Improving rotorcraft safety requires cooperation between the government and the
industry, which is made up of rotorcraft manufacturers and operators. The government
improves safety by enhancing safety regulations, while the industry develops the required
technologies to satisfy those regulatory requirements. As stated earlier, the adoption of
CFIT-avoidance technology will require the investment of financial resources beyond the
initial aircraft acquisition and current operational costs for aircraft already in service.
The decision to invest resources in safety requires the equipment manufacturers,
operators, or government to understand the economic value of doing so. A cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) or an ROI analysis can facilitate the decision making (Stone, 2005).
Selecting the best method for making the assessment is based on the perspective and
goals of the party performing the analysis.
A CBA, also known as a benefit-cost analysis, is an examination of the costs
associated with the implementation of projects or activities and the benefits realized from
them. All costs and benefits are examined regardless of who bore the costs or realized
the benefits: the producer, the consumer, or a third party. The comparison is made in the
same unit of measurement, usually a monetary unit like dollars. A CBA can be used to

8
evaluate different programs or solutions to determine the one for which the benefits
exceed the costs and allocate the resources accordingly. Performing this type of analysis
can become difficult when identifying and valuing the benefits (FAA, 1998; Guzman &
Asgari, 2014). For government outputs, through regulation or otherwise, a CBA may
prove to be adequate for the purpose of evaluating the alternatives, but since they are not
sold under market conditions, their value to consumers, the benefits they provide, become
difficult to determine (FAA, 1998). It is therefore necessary to identify how the benefits
are to be determined and evaluated for each specific CBA. A CBA as a public sector
investment appraisal approach that provides information to decision-makers on the
economic viability of different alternatives and their benefits to the community (Civil
Aviation Safety Authority, 2010) differs from an ROI analysis that focuses on private
investments.
ROI, by definition, is the ratio of gain to investment and measures the return, cost
savings, profit, or cost avoidance that result from a given use of money (Feldman,
Jazouli, & Sandborn, 2009). ROI is the monetary benefit derived from having spent
money on developing, changing, or managing a product or system. It is an economic
measure used to evaluate the efficiency of an investment (Chang, Sandborn, Pecht, Yung,
& Wang, 2015). An ROI analysis is also considered to be a type of CBA conducted from
an investor’s perspective (Stone, 2005). Westerlind (2004) suggests that an ROI analysis
can be used as a financial measurement to develop a company’s business case and
increase management and investor confidence. According to Banks, Reichard, Crow, and
Nickell (2009), individuals in the Prognostic and Health Management (PHM) technology
field usually reference the reduced maintenance costs, increased operational availability,
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and improved safety based on anecdotal evidence to respond to prospective customers’
questions on the benefits of implementing the technology. They suggest that such an
answer only provides an understanding of the practical benefits but not a justification for
investing in the equipment, and an ROI analysis would be appropriate.
It has been observed that the adoption of a voluntary safety improvement process
such as a Safety Management System (SMS) that increases business costs, depends on
the proposer’s ability to demonstrate its economic viability. Though the implementation
costs of such programs or processes can be easily identified, the benefits can be more
difficult to identify and quantify, as there is no one accepted approach or standard for the
aviation industry. Industry leaders therefore need to be incentivized to adopt solutions
like SMS through the application of generally accepted economic models in the valuation
of the output or benefits (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). The adoption of CFITavoidance equipment, beyond the HAA operations, is voluntary and therefore requires
the identification and quantification of the expected benefits. Canada’s Department of
Transport used a CBA when making the case for amending the regulatory requirements
to expand the adoption of TAWS equipped with Enhanced Altitude Accuracy function to
all private turbine-powered and commercial aircraft with six or more passenger seats.
According to the Department of Transport, this action would cost $59 million and
provide $216 million in benefits by avoiding additional safety costs with a reduction in
CFIT accidents. The effort was expected to yield a net benefit of $157 million over a 10year implementation period (Department of Transport, 2011). If this change was not
mandated for operators, understanding the ROI would have been critical in determining
whether to voluntarily adopt the technology. For rotorcraft operators, an ROI analysis
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can provide some insight into the financial implications of broadly adopting the CFITavoidance technology.
A review of available aviation safety literature indicated that a gap exists on
models or methods used for performing an ROI analysis for the adoption of a given
aircraft technology or equipment as a safety intervention. Research emphasis has been on
safety management systems or programs (Lercel, Steckel, Mondello, Carr, & Patankar,
2011; Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Figlock, 2000; Taylor, 2000). Of the research performed,
the CBA which considers the public costs and benefits was the method of choice.
Examples include a CBA on accident safety costs for airline aircraft (Cavka & Cokorilo,
2012), airport security (Stewart & Mueller, 2013), aviation security (Stewart & Mueller,
2014), and the U.K. offshore helicopter industry (Mitchell, 2006). For broader adoption
of CFIT-avoidance technology, going beyond the CBA and performing an ROI analysis
that considers the private costs and benefits can facilitate decision making for the
industry (operators and helicopter manufacturers) who are likely to invest in the required
resources.
Significance of the Study
For close to a decade, as previously stated, the 80% reduction of helicopter
accidents has been a key objective of the IHST. The NTSB, FAA, and European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) have worked closely as partners toward the
improvement of aviation safety across the globe. They have continued to highlight the
need to accelerate the adoption rate of safety technology in order to reduce the number of
accidents. The FAA has used mandates to facilitate the adoption of the technology in
some operations such as the HAA, but a gap exists when other operations are considered.
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This study sought to provide operators and rotorcraft manufacturers (the industry) with a
method of estimating the potential ROI that can be achieved when the industry is in the
process of making the decision to voluntarily adopt rotorcraft safety technologies. For
this study, the ROI was considered from the rotorcraft manufacturers’ and operators’
perspective, as they will be actively investing financial resources for the integration of the
technology into the fielded fleet. Rotorcraft manufacturers were also to be considered
operators as they are involved in flight training and flight test operations. The ROI
methodology applied in this study can be used in the future to evaluate whether new or
existing technologies, like those identified in the NLR (2014) report, provide a ROI for
those investing the resources to implement them. The results of an ROI analysis can
facilitate better and timely decision making and justification of resource allocation,
planning, and implementation of safety improvements by the industry.
Statement of the Problem
Improving safety within any industry requires the investment of various resources
that come with financial implications for the organizations involved. Research has
shown that organizations focusing on the well-being and safety of their workforce by
building a culture of health yield a greater value for their investors (Fabius, Thayer,
Konicki, Yarborough, Peterson, Isaac, Loeppke, Eisenburg, & Dreger, 2013).
Additionally, safety is considered an indicator of an organization’s performance, such as
enhancing product quality and plant performance. Improving safety or the perception of
improving safety could be good business (Veltri, Pagell, Behm, & Das, 2007).
To improve rotorcraft safety, resources must be invested, and organizations are
expected to show the added value for their benefactors or investors. Existing research
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does not provide a methodology of estimating the potential ROI when aircraft equipment
or technology is adopted by operators. To encourage the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance
technology beyond the HAA operations, the researcher will explore the ROI that could
potentially be achieved with the implementation of the safety recommendations issued by
the NTSB in 2005 and in line with the recent mandates issued for HAA operations. An
ROI is a suitable metric by which the industry can determine if an investment in the
broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology is advisable. Since the operators
(customers) and rotorcraft manufacturers would be considered investors in this case, a
private ROI analysis would be suitable, where the tangible financial benefits are
considered. The societal benefits are usually considered when a CBA is being
performed. A private ROI excludes costs and benefits where the public (society) and the
government are the sole beneficiaries (Landau, Weisbrod & Alstadt, 2010). Taylor
(2000) provides an example of a private ROI by evaluating the different approaches of
implementing maintenance resource management (MRM) concepts by an airline. The
benefits and costs considered did not include those external to the organization (societal).
For the rotorcraft industry, gaps exist in ROI estimation techniques related to the
adoption of safety technology (especially for the CFIT-avoidance technology) and
understanding of the financial impact of the operators opting to voluntarily adopt the
technology. The focus of existing research has been mostly on CBAs, and this study
sought to provide a method of performing the ROI analysis.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to estimate the potential ROI that could be achieved
if the readily available CFIT-avoidance technology was more widely adopted by the
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helicopter industry using actual helicopter accidents and the safety costs associated with
their outcomes. The study estimated the ROI likely to be achieved with the broader
adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology by:
i.

Determining and evaluating the costs associated with accidents of
different helicopter categories including, but not limited to: loss of aircraft,
damage to aircraft, loss of crew and passengers, accident investigation
costs, loss of investment, and crew replacement costs;

ii.

Determining and evaluating costs associated with adoption of the CFITavoidance technology including: equipment acquisition, installation,
training, and lifecycle support (sustainment);

iii.

Determining the CFIT accident rate (probability of occurrence) by
helicopter category;

iv.

Determining and evaluating the benefits associated with the accident costs
likely to be avoided as a result of the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance
technology for operators and rotorcraft manufacturers; and,

v.

Applying the appropriate formula to estimate the ROI likely to be
achieved with the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology.

Research Questions
The research involved the application of an appropriate financial formula to estimate
the potential ROI that can be achieved with the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance
technology within the rotorcraft industry. The ROI was estimated from the rotorcraft
manufacturers’ and operators’ perspective for they would bear the responsibility of
investing resources when equipping their respective aircraft. Manufacturers were
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considered investors based on their involvement in rotorcraft operations for development,
production, and training purposes. For this study, the accidents examined occurred
between January 2005 and December 2015, the period since EGPWS/TAWS for
rotorcraft became available (Kraemer, 2002). The research addressed the following
questions:
a) What are the estimated costs likely to be experienced by rotorcraft operators
as a result of a CFIT accident?
b) How can operators estimate the potential ROI for the broader adoption of
safety technology such as the CFIT-avoidance technology?
c) Do the ROI results support the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology
beyond the mandated HAA operations?
Delimitations
The study did not attempt to address the ROI on CFIT-avoidance technology
adoption in different regions of the globe. Rather, it focused on general aviation
helicopter operation accidents within the United States. The historical accident data
reports prepared by the NTSB and FAA for helicopter CFIT events were used to
determine the probability of future CFIT accidents occurring, the costs associated with
such accidents, and costs likely to be incurred when adopting the technology to avoid
future accidents. The accident reports were retrieved from the NTSB Aviation Accident
Database. For the ROI analysis, all commercial helicopter operations were considered.
The period of interest for the data was from January 1, 2005, through December 31,
2015. The accident reports considered had a finalized status identifying the probable
cause and safety recommendations, where applicable.
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While five technologies were identified for mitigation of CFIT accidents, only the
EGPWS/TAWS, laser radar obstacle and terrain avoidance system, digital map, and radar
altimeter were considered for adoption. This purposefully limited technology adoption to
those technologies that would be installed on the aircraft where an operator would incur
the cost. The cost of installing equipment such as the passive tower-based Obstacle
Collision Avoidance System would be incurred by the government, as it is not installed
onboard the aircraft.
Limitations and Assumptions
This research focused on the potential ROI to be achieved on the adoption of
CFIT-avoidance technology. It considered the safety costs associated with a CFIT
accident and the probability of occurrence based on the accidents that occurred during the
period of interest. When performing an ROI analysis or a CBA, costs associated with the
aircraft accidents to be considered depend on whether they are social or private costs.
The cost categories considered included those identified under the Aviation Safety
Targets for Effective Regulation (ASTER) project conducted by the National Aerospace
Laboratory NLR (2001) for the European Commission. For the ROI analysis, the
accident cost categories were limited to those directly related to the accident outcomes;
for example, loss of aircraft use, loss of resale value, and loss of revenue are private
costs. Costs such as site contamination and clearance, loss of baggage, and airport
closure were not considered, as they are considered public costs. It must be noted that the
ASTER cost categories were reflective of those of an airline aircraft accident and were
scaled to that of accidents in rotorcraft operations by adopting the appropriate values for
each category of costs. The accident costs considered for this study were those incurred
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in an accident that is operational (intended flight) and primarily were a result of the
aircraft coming into contact with an obstacle or terrain while the pilot still had control.
Ideally the aircraft should not have been experiencing other anomalies such as engine or
structural failure.
The aircraft accident reports may not explicitly state in the safety
recommendations that the installation of the CFIT-avoidance equipment could have
prevented the accident. Therefore, for this specific study it was assumed that the
installation of the equipment on all the identified accident helicopters would have more
than likely helped to prevent the eventual accident. The accident reports included in the
analysis were factual reports, that is, the accident investigation had been completed.
The costs associated with a helicopter accident or the adoption of the different
CFIT-avoidance technology will vary by the source and category. A detailed analysis of
each category was performed. As the technology already exists, it was assumed that all
costs associated with the research, development, and production of the pieces of
equipment were already factored into the retail price. The method used to extract the cost
data from the different data sources such as websites, catalogs, quotes, and databases of
the various vendors, original equipment manufacturers, customer service facilities, and
operators depended on how the data are stored. These sources can vary over time, and
therefore, the data were limited to the time they were extracted with no consideration
given to future updates. It was also assumed that the method used to estimate the ROI
would be flexible enough to allow iterative estimates to be made for future analysis.
An additional assumption was that the safety initiatives implemented by the
organization, for example the SMS, would not be the leading factor for the reduction in
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the CFIT accident rate. Though these safety initiatives can be considered confounding
variables, the definition of a CFIT accident suggests that without the information
presented by the CFIT-avoidance equipment, the pilot while still in control of the aircraft,
is unlikely to be aware of the impending collision. It was also assumed that the reduction
on the accident rate would largely be achieved by the industry adopting the available
CFIT technology.

Definitions of Terms
Accident

An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that
takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft
with the intention of flight and all such persons have
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious
injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage
(CFR Title 49 830.2).

Accident costs

Also referred to as aircraft safety costs are the costs an
operator is likely to experience as the direct or indirect
consequences of an accident. Direct costs are those primarily
related to the aircraft airframe and occupants and include:
deaths, injuries, aircraft physical damage, loss of resale value,
aircraft loss of use, and loss of baggage. Indirect costs are
those costs related to other consequences of the accident
including: search and rescue costs, costs of airline immediate
response, costs of accident investigation, loss of investment
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income, increased costs of insurance, and costs of loss of
reputation (Cavka & Cokorilo, 2012).
Accident outcomes

These are the observable and measurable effects or

consequences of an accident. These outcomes include severity
of injuries or number of deaths of crew and passengers,
severity of aircraft damage, extent of damage to environment
and infrastructure, and injury or death to civilians on ground.
CFIT

An accident that occurs when an airworthy aircraft is flown
under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain, water
surface, or obstacles, with inadequate awareness on the part of
the pilot of the impending collision (FAA, 2003). These
accidents to some extent can be attributed to the pilot’s lack of
awareness of the aircraft’s altitude relative to proximate terrain
and obstacles and usually occur when the pilot cannot visually
ascertain terrain / obstacles in prevailing flight conditions
(FAA,2007).

CFIT-avoidance Technology
Refers to a component or system that, when installed in
aircraft, has the potential to mitigate the occurrence of a CFIT
accident (including water and obstacles). For the purposes of
this study, wire strikes were included relative to the equipment
configuration under consideration.
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Industry

For the purpose of this study, the industry was considered as
the rotorcraft manufacturers and operators. Rotorcraft
manufacturers perform development test, training, sales
demonstration, post-maintenance, and production (ferry) flights
and are exposed to the same risk of incurring a CFIT.

ROI

The monetary benefit to the investor resulting from an investment
in the development, change, or management of a product or
system. In safety, the ROI is a means of measuring the benefit of
investing financial resources to the improvement of safety.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
This literature review provides an overview of the ROI analyses or cost-benefit
assessments as applied within the aviation industry of the costs associated with aviation
accidents, benefits associated with safety improvements, and a summary of CFITavoidance technology. Though the purpose of this study is to estimate the ROI that can
be achieved from broadly adopting the CFIT-avoidance technology, it is useful to
understand how costs and benefits have been identified when CBAs have been performed
with respect to the aviation industry. As previously described, a ROI is considered as the
ratio of gain to investment and measure of the “return”, cost savings, profit, or cost
avoidance that results from a given use of money (Feldman et al., 2009), and therefore
understanding the costs is important. For the broader adoption of any given technology,
the ROI can be assessed at the industry level, and, in this case, the industry will be
defined as an entity comprising of rotorcraft manufacturers and operators.
As helicopter operations have progressively become more complex and
challenging, manufacturers and operators have continued to take advantage of
technological improvements to provide pilots the operational flexibility they need. The
introduction of new and advanced computerized aircraft systems has increased safety
levels by reducing pilots’ workload and increasing operational capabilities (Tsang &
Vidulich, 2004).
A continuing challenge for the aviation industry and others is the ability to adopt
new technology in a cost effective and timely manner. This challenge is a result of
operators trying to achieve a safety and economic equilibrium that is dictated by the
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productivity and profitability limits set within contemporary transport analyses. It is
therefore necessary to develop a method of assessing the costs of safety in the event of an
accident, and the benefits that may be realized on making the necessary investments in
safety improvements (Cavka & Cokorilo, 2012).
In today’s competitive environment experienced at a global level, all businesses
have to demonstrate their profitability and value to shareholders by decreasing their
overhead costs and operating expenses (Jervis & Collins, 2001). The various segments of
these businesses are expected to demonstrate their value to the organization as the
business continues to evolve in a fast-paced environment. One of the value propositions
is that a competitive advantage may be created by an organization through investments
for improved product, health, and environmental safety. Safety managers therefore need
a decision tool to help them determine which elements of a safety program will offer the
best ROI (Jervis & Collins, 2001). For rotorcraft manufacturers, these elements of a
safety program include safety technology developed and integrated into its fleet as well
as their customers’ fleet to mitigate a specific safety hazard or improve aircraft operations
for pilot and crew. With rotorcraft manufacturers also being operators, they are likely to
incur the same costs as their customers if they lost an aircraft in an accident during flight
test, production, or training activities. By investing in new safety technologies for their
fleet, they experience the same benefits.
The continued growth of aviation activity around the world comes with a risk of
an increase in the number of incidents and accidents currently being experienced. This
possibility highlights the need to develop and adopt safety technology in a proactive
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manner. The adoption of new safety technology requires a thoughtful process for its
introduction into the market since its adoption will depend on:
1) How easy it is to integrate into existing aircraft systems and its performance;
2) If it meets the customers’ needs;
3) The existing socio-economic conditions; and,
4) The opinion of leaders and stakeholders (Tang, 2006).
Adopting any new safety technology requires the investment of resources in
aircraft equipment. Understanding the value proposition for such pieces of equipment to
each stakeholder group is important. For one customer group, the adoption of the
equipment may be a high value proposition, while for another it’s a losing one (Marais &
Weigel, 2006). Cost issues can influence the commitment of resources for safety efforts
in complex environments. In aviation and medical practice where the teams highly
interact with technology, safety is paramount (Helmerich, 2000). In order to propose the
broader adoption of safety technology, one needs to understand the costs involved, the
issues that may arise, and to perform a cost benefit analyses or ROI analysis. This can be
done at an industry or organizational level.
Return on Investment
The goal of performing an ROI analysis is to evaluate the impact an investment
has on owners of an organization or industry. Impact can be assessed in terms of the
benefits and costs resulting from the investment as observed from the perspective of the
investor or individual performing the analysis. The versatility and simplicity of the ROI
metric makes it a useful tool for developing a company’s business case and increasing the
management and investors’ confidence (Westerlind, 2004). Returns or benefits can be in
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three forms: economic, socio-economic, and social. Economic returns are the financial
returns created by the investment; socio-economic returns are savings the state or society
realizes, while social returns are the less tangible effects such as an increased sense of
self-esteem and personal independence (Krlev, Munscher, & Mulbert, 2013). For the
adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology, the tangible costs and benefits can be
evaluated from the industry’s perspective, and a review of past research can facilitate the
identification of those that are applicable.
A review of current research showed that safety ROI research has been focused
more on the operations aspect than the aircraft equipment and technology one. CBAs
that account for societal or public costs and benefits have been used to determine whether
technology and aircraft equipment changes being mandated for safety improvements
would not have a negative financial impact. The most prominent research on safety ROI
resulted in the development of the ORC Network Occupational Safety and Health Group
software named ORC Return on Health, Safety, and Environment Investments
(ROHSEI). This software has been widely used by companies, government agencies, and
educational institutions to evaluate and communicate the business value of HSE
investments specific in projects and the overall business (Linhard, 2005).
The ROHSEI process considers both direct and hidden impacts on business
performance. Direct impacts are those easily identified and quantifiable impacts that
include capital, production downtime, and personnel time. These impacts are assessed
using various cost parameters such as: property damage, production downtime, design
and engineering time, and operational personnel time, among others. Hidden impacts are
those that affect business performance and include: worker productivity, product quality,
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and customer satisfaction. They are more difficult to identify and quantify as they are
associated with the project in question and require feedback to the analysis team from the
individuals involved (Linhard, 2005).
Johnson and Avers (2012) described a process for predicting and / or measuring
the safety and financial ROI for human factors safety interventions. Using the ROI
calculator developed by the FAA and Booze, Allen, Hamilton Consulting, the researchers
demonstrated how an individual with technical expertise to identify the benefits and
investments associated with the safety intervention can evaluate the ROI. With the
accident and incident data available from a large maintenance organization where fatigue
was found to be a contributory factor, the researchers calculated the ROI. The company
identified the costs involved in delivering fatigue training to employees and estimated the
expected benefits from a reduction in equipment damage and injuries. An ROI of 312%
over six quarters was calculated using the calculator’s basic formula:
ROI = [(Net Returns or Benefits) – Investment (Cost)] / [Investment (Cost)]
where: Net Returns or Benefits = Estimated Return (Benefits) * Probability of Success
The Center for Aviation Research (CASR) performed a study to illustrate the
business benefits of a Safety Management System (SMS) by developing an analytical
framework through which the various types of costs associated with the SMS are
accounted for (Lercel et al., 2011). Using the macro-to-micro analytical framework, the
business benefits of safety programs were evaluated. At the macro-level, an analysis of
the stock value of an airline after a major accident showed that the value of the airline
could depreciate by as much as 25% and take over a year to recover. At the mid-level,
the analysis showed that financial benefits of safety programs can only be realized when

27
a program is sufficiently targeted toward a specific behavioral change. At the microlevel, the researchers used examples to illustrate how the costs and safety benefits of a
particular safety invention can be tracked, and the desired return is not always achieved
within the first year but over a period that is dependent on different factors. The safety
investment model presented in their research portrayed the SMS as a combination of
multiple safety initiatives with varying rates of return, risk, and period of return (Lercel et
al., 2011). When applied broadly, these SMS initiatives can include the adoption of
safety technology.
Stewart and Mueller (2013) performed a cost-benefit analysis of aviation security
measures employed to prevent attacks on airports and their associated facilities to
determine the optimal security measures. The three measures evaluated were the Federal
Air Marshal Service (FAMS), the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program, and the
installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB). Consideration was given to the threat
likelihood, costs of security measure, hazard likelihood, risk reduction, and expected
losses. The cost-effectiveness of the measures was compared using three criteria: (1) net
present value, (2) benefit-to-cost ratio, and (3) break even analysis, to assess where the
risk probability becomes too high for the measure to be cost effective. The researchers
found that the IPSBs and FFDO programs were cost effective if the annual attack
probability exceeded 0.5% and 2% respectively. A reduction in the FAMS budget was
also found to be a viable policy alternative. These results provide a basis for making the
right risk management decisions for these security measures.
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Stewart and Muller (2014) further performed a cost-benefit analysis of measures
designed to provide enhanced protection for airport terminals and their associated
facilities. In this study, four significant threat scenarios were considered:
1) a large truck bomb,
2) a curbside car bomb,
3) a luggage or vest bomb, and
4) a public grounds shooting attack.
The protective measures included:
1) the addition of permanent vehicle search points,
2) check-in and screening personnel,
3) curbside blast deflection and shatterproof glass,
4) training airport police rapid response team to special weapons and tactics
standards,
5) directing vehicles to remote lots,
6) eliminating lanes closest to the terminal,
7) adding support columns for upper level roadways,
8) searching all luggage entering terminals, and
9) adding 30 handheld bomb sniffers and bomb sniffing dogs.
To evaluate the costs-effectiveness of these measures, the researchers applied risk-based
decision theory with the same three criteria in their previous research as described earlier
plus Monte-Carlo simulation methods to propagate the hazard likelihood. The
researchers found that the attack probabilities would have to be much higher than the
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levels observed at that time to justify the additional protective measures and the
investment of financial resources.
One of the most critical functions of original equipment manufacturers and
operators is to ensure their assets such as combat vehicles and aircraft are available for
operations when needed. To achieve a high operational availability, the operation,
maintenance, and logistic support of the assets should be effectively managed. The
utilization of Prognostic and Health Management (PHM) technology allows the operators
to acquire detailed health information to facilitate the achievement of the set operational
availability goals (Banks et al., 2009). A cost-benefit analysis was found to be useful in
supporting the estimation of the expected ROI for a customer who is considering
adopting PHM technology. The research showed the relationship between a CBA and
ROI when the ROI was to be used as a decision metric. Banks et al. (2009) provided a
general methodology for conducting the cost-benefit analysis with the following
considerations:


the scope of the PHM system,



the upfront or acquisition and installation costs,



the life-cycle costs (spares and maintenance),



projected usage profile of the platform, and



planned depot overhauls and scheduled maintenance overhauls.

An estimated payback period for the PHM technology and its impact over the asset’s
lifecycle was also determined. The ROI calculation was based on the formula:
ROI = (Benefit Gain-Technology Cost) / Technology Cost
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Jervis and Collins (2001) applied the Analytical Hierarchy process as a tool for
determining which safety program elements offer the best ROI. The authors considered
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Voluntary Protection
Programs as the model safety program for which the process can be applied due to their
comprehensive safety management approach. The research focused on six managerial
safety program elements:
a) management leadership and employee involvement,
b) worksite analysis,
c) hazard prevention and control,
d) safety and health training,
e) documentation review, and
f) occurrence of bargaining agent.
The results showed that the hazard “prevention and control” and “management leadership
and employee involvement” elements provided the highest benefit-to-cost ratio. These
are generally considered the basic requirements for a successful safety program.
ROI analyses or cost-benefit analyses for safety systems have been performed in
other industries. In the road transport industry, three onboard safety systems (OBSS):
lane departure warning (LDW), roll stability control (RSC), and forward collision
warning (FCW) for Class 7 and 8 trucks were analyzed for their economic and cost
benefits (Department of Transport, 2013). The direct and indirect benefits associated
with a reduction in crashes from the use of OBSS were compared with the costs of
deploying each system. The costs were associated with the technology acquisition,
installation, maintenance, replacement, and training. The benefits included the tax
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deduction savings associated with the OBSS investment, operational, environmental,
labor compensation, property damage, legal settlement, court costs, medical related costs,
monetized value of pain and suffering, and lost productivity. The results showed that the
estimated benefits of LWD and RSC systems outweighed the estimated costs, while no
significant difference was observed for the FCW system. The LWD and RSC systems
benefits to the carrier outweighed the costs by a factor (benefits-to-costs ratio) of 14.69 to
4.95 and 12.50 to 4.7 respectively. The FCW system benefits-to-costs ratio was not
determined as the benefits were found not to be a statistically significant factor
(Department of Transport, 2013).
A review of the existing literature on ROI as detailed above showed that for the
aviation, in the same manner as other transport sectors, CBAs had been extensively used
to determine the benefits of adopting safety technology. In aviation, when the ROI
methodology has been used, it has been limited to operations. To address the existing
gap on performing ROI analysis on rotorcraft safety improvements, this research
reviewed the different economic models that can be applied with the goal of proposing an
applicable method of evaluating the safety costs and benefits of broadly adopting the
CFIT-avoidance technology.
Performing an ROI evaluation. In the aviation industry, various economic
models have been applied to estimate the benefits achieved by implementing safety
improvements. To inform and encourage organizations to be early adopters of Safety
Management Systems, Whealan-George (2013) reviewed the different economic models
that can be used to estimate the potential benefits. These models are:
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1) Accounting Approach: The basic direct accounting approach applied by Friend
(2011) and Skydel (2011) estimates the total business costs with and without
safety interventions based on historical data and probability of occurrence. This
direct approach does not take into account how an industry’s business operation
constantly changes over time, thereby skewing the estimated savings.
2) Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing (TABC): a proprietary financial
methodology developed by John Cox of Safety Operating Systems and Triant
Flouris to estimate an airline’s safety costs. The TABC captures costs associated
with any organizational activity that has an impact on safety (Rosenkrans, 2011).
The organization can identify the variable and fixed costs that safety officers can
adjust to simulate their business and predict their cost saving on safety initiatives.
3) FAAs Return on Investment simulator: An FAA accounting worksheet and
PowerPoint training course used for estimating the benefits of expended costs on
safety initiatives and the probability of the identified safety events occurring. The
output from the ROI simulator facilitate the conversations between safety and
financial specialists on the expected ROI over a period of six quarters by
presenting the pre- and post-safety intervention values (Rosenkrans, 2011). The
outputs consist of these five graphs: (1) investments and returns over time; (2)
investment profile; (3) financial return profile; (4) probability of success; and (5)
total safety events over time. The FAA accounting worksheet utilizes the
formula:
ROI = {[(estimated return or benefits * probability of success as a percentage) –
(investment costs)]/ (investment costs)}
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4) Cost-benefit analysis using historical data: This model was applied by the FAA
when it determined that Part 121 operators could benefit from implementing a
SMS for their organizations. The FAA determined the economic value by
assuming a 50% reduction on the losses from the 172 accidents that could have
been wholly or partially prevented by the adoption of an SMS due to its
formalized and intensive nature of addressing safety issues (Whealan-George,
2013).
5) Cost-optimization algorithms combined with probable-risk: A simulation with
budget constraints and failure probabilities allows an organization to determine
which events or precursors to events can be addressed in order to achieve greater
cost savings. Addressing lower level events reduces the probability of the costly
high level critical failure occurring (Whealan-George, 2013).
6) Analytical Hierarchical Process: Though not fully an economic model, the
process breaks down complex processes into sub-processes and assigns them
numerical values representing their weighting, priority, and significance levels.
This approach in a safety improvement environment requires an individual, based
on their experience and knowledge, to detail the elements of the safety
improvement and prioritize them by their perceived benefit of its application. The
intangible (indirect) benefits can be difficult to quantify, and the process can
become time consuming (Jervis & Collins, 2001; Whealan-George, 2013).
7) Simulation model using system dynamics and data mining: This model employs a
system dynamics approach incorporating human decision making and system drift
over a period of time leading to an accident. Charles-Owaba and Adebiyi (2006)
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employed the model for a pre- and post-safety program evaluation of a
manufacturing organization.
8) Baldrige Performance of Excellence Model: This model is used to estimate the net
social value of improved quality performance. It would therefore require the
social value of the benefits of safety improvements to be defined beyond the basic
financial terms.
9) Contrarian view of safety at any costs and modeling benefits: This economic view
suggests that the safety has already reached a long term economic equilibrium
despite the various methods of measuring benefits (Vasign, Fleming, & Tacker,
2008). They were in the opinion that economic models may not necessarily be
the best method of evaluating the economic benefits of an SMS as the intangibles
such as passenger reaction, labor reaction, liability risks, and government
enforcement are difficult to measure.
The economic models described above provide different approaches to estimating the
ROI or cost-benefits associated with the safety interventions under consideration. The
safety specialist has to decide which model to utilize depending on its applicability, its
complexity, the available resources, scope of the study, and the costs and benefits under
consideration. Understanding the costs and benefits associated with the adoption of
CFIT-avoidance technology will be critical to performing a more representative ROI.
Benefits and costs the rotorcraft industry may experience include the avoidance of future
accident safety costs and reduction in insurance costs, as discussed herein.
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Accident Safety Costs
Reducing the losses experienced by an organization or industry is the first goal of
introducing safety technology. These losses can be measured in terms of costs of lives,
time, material, and equipment, depending on the type of industry. Huang, Leamon,
Courtney, DeArmond, Chen, and Blair (2009) designed a study to explore the perceptions
of corporate financial decision makers on the impact of safety on a company’s financial
performance. The researchers estimated that for every dollar spent on direct costs
associated with occupational injuries, $2.12 was spent on indirect costs, while the return
on every dollar invested on safety was $4.41 based on the 5,840 fatal and 4.1 million
non-fatal occupational injuries that were reported in 2006 in the U.S. private industry.
This ROI suggests that a company should consider investing the right amount of financial
resources to address the most critical safety concerns for its industry. This also requires a
good understanding of the costs which are to be incurred or avoided for each initiative.
The responsibility of providing evidence to an organization’s management
showing how investing in safety can be worthwhile and how it can be accomplished lies
with the safety professional (Friend, 2011). The safety professional should therefore
provide quality information to assist management in making decisions. This information
not only includes the costs, but also the intangible elements such as the enhancement or
loss of reputation, positive versus adverse publicity, and goodwill from the public and
employees. In providing the ROI information to management, the safety practitioner
must consider the losses that may occur, the risk (exposure to the losses), and costs
associated with those losses that occur (Friend, 2011).
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In aviation, past aircraft safety cost-benefit analyses have identified two cost
categories: direct and indirect costs (Čavka & Čokorilo, 2012; Čokorilo, Gvozdenović,
Vasov, & Mirosavljević, 2010). These cost-benefit evaluations were based on the cost
implications defined by the National Aerospace Laboratory (2001) as shown in Table 1.
The costs of these accidents were determined primarily on the aircraft type and level of
damage. In these two studies, the A320-200 and A380 aircrafts were considered, and the
same cost categories can be scaled down to reflect costs of a helicopter accident.

Table 1
Accident Safety Costs
Direct Cost Category
Aircraft physical damage

Cost Description
Minor (15% damage)
Moderate (50% damage)
Major (80% damage)
Disaster (100% damage)
Catastrophic (100% damage)

Possible loss of resale value

5-10% of aircraft market value (for partial losses)

Aircraft loss of use

Monthly lease cost x assumed months to replace

Aircraft loss of investment
return

Part of aircraft loss of use

Site contamination and
clearance

Wide body: 1.2-2.8 M€
Narrow body: 0. 7-1.3 M€
Smaller aircraft: 0.13-0.2 M€

Airline costs for delay

Wide body: 22 € x number of passengers on flight
Narrow body: 20 € x number of passengers on
flight
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Airport closure

Airport disruption depends on severity of the
accident. Only applicable if accident occurs on or
close to the runway.

Deaths and injuries

Value of a Statistical Life (VOSL): 1-2.64 M€
VOSL differs per country. Value of injury is 13%
of VOSL.

Loss of staff investment

Replacement cost per pilot: 45000 €

Loss of baggage

Underfloor cargo carried on passenger flights:
110000 €
Personal baggage on passenger flights: 45000 €

Indirect Cost Category
Search and Rescue (SAR)
costs

Cost Description
Average SAR costs: 0.6 M€

Airline immediate response

Average costs per accident: 0.5-3 M€

Cost of accident investigation

State: 0.1-100 M€
Airline: 1 M€
Manufacturer: 1 M€

Third party damage

Third party death and injury: use similar VOSL as
in passenger death and injury + third party physical
damage

Loss of investment income

These costs are reflected in insurance premiums.

Increased cost of insurance

Loss of 20% insurance discount for airline involved

Loss of reputation

Airline loss of turnover: 0-380 M€ (Huge range.
Loss to society is far less than to airline, since
major part of reduced demand will shift to other
airline.)
Manufacturer (Likely that airlines will buy aircraft
from other manufacturers.)

Note. Adapted from “Aviation Safety Targets for Effective Regulation, a Consolidated
Report,” by National Aerospace Laboratory, NLR, 2001.
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According to the NLR (2001), the most significant determinants of costs arising
from aircraft accidents are aircraft damage, death and injury of occupants, and loss of
reputation of an airline (operator). The magnitude of these direct and indirect costs is
directly linked to the severity of an accident where severity is determined by the level of
damage and number of deaths or injuries to the occupants. In the NLR analysis, the
accident severity scheme shown in Table 2 was used to model the effects of accident
severity on the level of cost. From this analysis, it’s expected that in a catastrophic
accident, an aircraft will be completely damaged and at least 80% of the occupants will
perish. CFIT accidents are more generally considered to have a catastrophic outcome due
to the nature of the events.

Table 2
Accident Classification Severity Scheme
Level
Catastrophic

Damage [%]
100

Death [%]
80

Disaster

100

30

Major

80

0

Moderate

50

0

Minor

15

0

Note. Adapted from “Aviation Safety Targets for Effective Regulation, a Consolidated
Report,” by National Aerospace Laboratory, NLR, 2001.

Aircraft physical damage. The actual costs arising from the damage of an
aircraft can vary greatly depending on the age of an aircraft, extent of damage, and
financial inflation. To determine the average loss of aircraft value with age, actual cost
figures for individual aircraft were collected. The costs were normalized to obtain an
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“index” for the relative degree of damage expressed as a percentage of the aircraft total
damage as shown previously in Table 2 (NLR, 2001). The cost value for the aircraft
physical damage can be determined by multiplying the aircraft’s market value and the
corresponding damage ratio (Čavka & Čokorilo, 2012). For rotorcrafts, the market value
(residual value) at any given period can be found in the Helivalue$, Inc. Helicopter Blue
Book.
Possible loss of resale value. Loss in resale value of an aircraft involved in an
accident amounts to approximately 5-10% of its market value. The losses are determined
by the degree of severity of the accident from minor, moderate, major, and disaster to
catastrophic. The disaster and catastrophic severities bear a complete loss of resale value
(NLR, 2001). In their research, Čavka & Čokorilo (2012) assumed a possible loss of
resale value of 5% for the minor, moderate, and major categories. A helicopter’s market
value can be determined from the Helicopter Blue Book.
Aircraft loss of use. These are costs incurred when the accident aircraft is not
available for flight operations and necessitates the leasing or purchase of a replacement
aircraft. The monthly leasing costs are expressed as a percentage of the average market
value and the estimated number of months the lease would last or before a new
replacement aircraft is introduced. This period was determined to be usually between six
to twelve months for the airline jets (Čavka & Čokorilo, 2012). Consideration should be
given to this cost category if a rotorcraft operator plans to use a leased aircraft until the
repair of the accident aircraft is complete or one obtains a new aircraft.
Occupants’ deaths and injuries. The injury and death of crew and passengers in
an aircraft accident is an unfortunate outcome, and determining the value of a life that is
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lost or the quality of life that will be lived is considered to be a difficult and undesirable
task. Even with this difficulty, the industry has made attempts to determine the value on
which to compensate families for the loss of or injury to their loved ones. Monetizing
these health impacts is a means of comparing benefits of a reduction in risk against the
costs and helps facilitate quicker and more consistent decision making. To this end,
different methods as highlighted by the European Commission (2009) have been used to
determine these values. They include:
a) Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY): This method uses available information on
improvements in health / life quality combined with the duration of that
improvement for its values. A year of life in perfect health is counted as 1.0, and
the value decreases for years of less than perfect health based on a value that
represents an average among different social groups. A common discount factor
is used to discount future life years.
b) Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY): This is the negative value of the QALY.
It measures the number of quality adjusted years that are lost in comparison to the
benchmarking scenario. For aviation accidents, the resulting disabilities would be
compared to similar outcomes for other accidents. DALY and QALY should lead
to comparable values if performed correctly (European Commission, 2009).
c) Healthy Life Years (HLY): This approach measures the number of quality
adjusted remaining life years per person and with future years discounted and
weighted across individuals. When using the remaining life expectancy as the
upper bound for summation, the HLY value should be comparable to the QALY
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value, as HLY is essentially a summation of the QALYs (European Commission,
2009).
d) Cost of Illness: A measure comprised of only the medical expenses related to the
incidence of an illness, and the lower the rate of occurrence, the saved expenses
constitute a benefit. If the risk option results in a higher occurrence of the illness,
the expenses are considered direct costs. This measure is limited as it does not
account for the indirect costs to society such as loss of labor hours (European
Commission, 2009).
e) Human Capital (HC): As a measure of the loss of social welfare, this method
attempts to measure the loss of future earnings as a result of disability or
premature death. The potential shortfall of this method is the different values
given to lives based solely on projected future earnings, the likely exclusion of
individuals outside of the workforce by assigning a value equal to zero, and the
individual’s preferences for safety not being reflected. Adopting average
monetary values for individuals outside the workforce can ease these concerns
(Andersson & Treich, 2011).
f) VOSL: defined as the monetary value of an improvement in safety to achieve a
risk reduction that would prevent one statistical death or injury. It is derived from
an individual’s Willingness to Pay (WTP) for reduced risk and the reduction
(European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2015). VOSL, as an
economic measure commonly used by governments, is also considered not to
adequately represent the value of a life but the risk, as it is derived from market
decisions. Basing the VOSL on perceived risk can introduce bias as the level of
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risk may vary with the perceptions of each individual (Viscusi, 2005). Estimating
the VOSL is considered challenging due to the limitations in identifying the
worker and job characteristics that may be correlated with the job and how the
workplace risks are to be measured (Lee, 2012). A method commonly used to
quantify an individual’s perception of the utility of safety improvements when
facing fatality risks is the maximum utility theory, and the determined value is
referred to as the subjective value of statistical life (Andersson, 2007; Yang, Liu,
& Xu, 2016). The utility of safety improvements results in a reduced fatality rate
that together with the income of individuals that benefit can be used to determine
the social value of statistical life. These safety improvements are assumed to have
been implemented using collected taxes (Yang, Liu, & Xu, 2016). The different
methods of determining VOSL create challenges, and therefore the choice of
VOSL will be dependent of the type of study being performed.
g) Value of Statistical Life Year (VOLY): Generally, VOLY is a measure of the
WTP for an increase of one additional year of life expectancy, and, like the
VOSL, does not measure the quality of life. A major concern with the application
of the VOLY, just like VOSL, is how to monetize a life without appearing to be
unethical when every individual’s life is considered priceless. The two measures
should reflect a change in risk or safety levels (European Commission, 2009).
h) Value of Statistical Injury: defined as the monetary value of an improvement in
safety to achieve injury risk reduction that would prevent one statistical injury
(Andersson & Treich, 2011). These values of improvement are represented as a
percentage of VOSL depending on the severity of the injury as categorized on the
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Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS). The injuries are classified into six categories
ranging from AIS Code 1 for minor injuries to AIS Code 6 for fatal injuries. The
valuation of each injury level is related to the loss of quality and quantity of life
resulting from an injury typical of that level and as a fraction of a fatality
(EUROCONTROL, 2015; FAA, 2016).
The availability of different measures for the monetized value of a life lost or injury
incurred in an accident provides options for an economic analysis. Each measure has its
limitations, but cost-benefit models have increasingly used the VOSL, a value that
includes an element of indemnity together with a society’s WTP to avoid a statistical
fatality (NLR, 2001). For aviation related economic analysis, the FAA and
EUROCONTROL have adopted the VOSL measure.
Scuffham, Chalmers, O’Hare, and Wilson (2002) estimated and compared the
direct and indirect costs of general aviation accidents. Consideration was given to
medical treatment, damage to aircraft and property, and accident investigation costs for
direct costs and HC and WTP approaches for indirect costs. The HC approach
considered the value of lost production from employed work and household activity. For
the WTP approach, the Land Transport Safety Authority’s estimated values of a society’s
willingness to pay to avoid a fatality or injury were considered. The direct and indirect
costs associated with aircraft accidents shown in Table 1 together with those related to
the integration of the technology can be appropriately modified and employed in
estimating the ROI likely to be achieved on the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology
from an operator and manufacturer perspective. Due to the limited information available
on the earnings or injuries for the crew and passengers lost or injured in rotorcraft
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accidents, the ROI analysis will adopt the recommended VOSL and VSI values
recommended by the U.S. Department of Transport (2015). The U.S. Department of
Transport has determined that the recommended VOSL for its analyses in 2015, based on
existing data, should be $9.4 million. With the WTP being difficult to estimate for an
entire range of disabilities that could be incurred in a transport accident, the Department
has rated injuries in terms of severity and duration on a scale of QALYs as compared to
the alternative of perfect health. The scores were grouped according to the AIS to yield
coefficients that can be applied to the VOSL to assign each injury class a value
corresponding to a fraction of a fatality, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3
Relative Disutility Factors by Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS)
AIS Level
AIS 1

Severity
Minor

Fraction of VSL
0.003

AIS 2

Moderate

0.047

AIS 3

Serious

0.105

AIS 4

Severe

0.266

AIS 5

Critical

0.593

AIS 6
Unsurvivable
1.000
Note. Adapted from “Guidance on Treatment of the economic Value of Statistical Life
(VSL) in Department of Transportation Analyses- 2015 Adjustment,” by U.S.
Department of Transport, 2015.

To determine the value of any given injury, the applicable fraction of the VSL is
multiplied by the 2015 VSL value of $9.4 million (U.S. Department of Transport, 2015).
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CFIT-Avoidance Technology
Aircraft manufacturers, component manufacturers, and aircraft operators identify
new products and technologies for integration into the industry in order to improve
customer experience and safety. The integration of some of these technologies is done as
a result of certification and operation regulation mandates where the main objective is to
increase the reliability of safety critical systems (Anderson, 2013). These critical systems
include those that have integrated the new technologies that target the reduction of
rotorcraft CFIT accidents.
According to the FAA (2011), the number of fatal CFIT accidents between 2010
and 2012 represented a reduction of more than 50% over the preceding three-year period,
2007 to 2009. The General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) attributed this
reduction in fatal accidents to the use of technologies such as global positioning system
(GPS) with moving maps that provide traffic, terrain, and in-flight weather information.
The GAJSC, at that time, further suggested that the implementation of new technologies
such as the angle of attack indicators, ballistic parachutes, and terrain avoidance
equipment would continue to further reduce the number of general aviation (GA) fatal
accidents (GAJSC, 2012).
The emphasis on the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology for rotorcraft
operations can be traced back to the benefits observed for the fixed-wing fleet where the
worldwide CFIT accident rate fell by 80 percent following the TAWS mandate (IHST,
2010). According to the FAA, TAWS has been considered by many in the airplane
(fixed-wing) safety community as the single most important safety device introduced to
prevent commercial fatal accidents in 20 years and has been voluntarily adopted in
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general aviation as part of GPS-based navigation systems (Department of Transportation,
2012). The FAA has mandated TAWS for HAA operations, but the anticipated safety
benefits may extend to other operations in the industry when the technology is adopted
broadly.
The U.S. Joint Helicopter Safety Analysis Team (2011) identified the installation
of proximity detection systems as one of its Intervention Recommendations (IRs) for
rotorcrafts accidents. The technology, it opined, would prove to be valuable in
identifying ground obstructions as helicopters operate regularly in close proximity to
obstacles. The CFIT-avoidance technologies recommended by the NLR (2014) are as
follows:
a. Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System / (Helicopter) Terrain Awareness
and Warning System (HTAWS): The HTAWS provides a “look-ahead” function
to detect terrain or obstacle conflicts by comparing the helicopter flight path to a
terrain and obstacle database. The helicopter’s position is based on the
information provided by an onboard GPS receiver. Caution alerts (advisory in
nature) and warning alerts (requiring pilot corrective actions) are generated if
there are terrain and obstacle conflicts along the helicopter’s flight path
(Department of Transport, 2012). HTAWS that integrates data from a wire
warning database system, for example WireWatch® and WireAware®, can reduce
the likelihood of collision with transmission mast and power lines (Garmin,
2016a; Sandel Avionics, 2012). Examples of existing systems include the
Honeywell MK XXI and XXII EGPWS, Garmin® HTAWS, and Sandel’s
ST3400H HeliTAWS®, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
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Figure 1. Honeywell EGPWS MK XXII. Retrieved from
https://parts.seaerospace.com/product_images/35/20324/medium/mkxxii.jpg
Copyright Southeast Aerospace. Adapted with permission.

Figure 2. Garmin® HTAWS (010-HTAWS-00). Retrieved from
https://buy.garmin.com/en-us/us/p/72799 Copyright GARMIN. Adapted with
permission.
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b. Laser radar obstacle and terrain avoidance system: This system uses an eye-safe
laser which is mounted on the helicopter’s fuselage to provide information to the
pilot through both displays and aural warnings on actively detected obstacles such
as cables, trees, pylons, power lines, or rising terrain in the helicopter’s flight
path. The laser radar obstacle warning system comes with a higher probability of
detection of thin wires, the real-time processing of the measured range image
data, obstacle classification, and its visualization on the displays (Bers, Schulz, &
Armbuster, 2005; Stevenson, Verdun, Stern & Koechner, 1994). Examples of
existing systems include the Fairchild Control’s HELLAS-A (Awareness) and
Selex ES LOAM.
c. Digital map: This system is also referred to as a digital moving map and provides
clear and precise information on the surrounding operational environment and can
change or maintain an updated position in correspondence with the aircraft’s
current position. The moving map’s information can be sourced from both
database and sensor technology (Jones, 2002). The moving map systems are
either standalone or integrated within the aircraft avionics suite and display the
map images on a Multi-Function Display (MFD). The advanced systems can
provide terrain and obstacle information to the pilot (NLR, 2014). Examples of
existing systems include the Flight Management Systems, Israel Aerospace
Industries, and Moving Terrain-MT Vision Air moving maps, as shown in Figure
3.
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Figure 3. MT VisionAir X Heli: Retrieved from http://www.movingterrain.de/lang-en/produkte/mt-visionair-x/mt-visionair-x-heli.html
Copyright Moving Terrain Air Navigation Systems AG, Germany. Adapted with
permission.

d. Radar altimeter: The radar altimeter is also referred to as a radio altimeter, and it
measures the actual altitude of an aircraft with respect to the terrain by measuring
how long it takes a beam of radio waves to reflect off the ground and return to the
aircraft. The radar altimeter can be integrated with other systems to fulfill the
requirements for advanced applications such as HTAWS and Terrain Collision
Avoidance System operations (Garmin, 2016b; NLR, 2014). Examples of
existing systems include Garmin’s GRATM 55 and 5500 (shown in Figure 4),
Honeywell AA-300, Freeflight Systems TRA-3000, and TRA-3500 altimeters.
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Figure 4. GRA™ 5500 Radar Altimeter. Retrieved from
https://buy.garmin.com/en-US/US/p/135561 Copyright GARMIN. Adapted with
permission.

Summary
A review of past literature shows that a gap exists within the body of knowledge for
the aviation industry on how to estimate the expected ROI when adopting safety
technology. The method of estimating an ROI should be predictive rather than a
retroactive approach, as seen with the OBSS for road transport. Aviation accident data
can be used to determine the probability of an accident occurring in the future and by the
industry to set accident reduction targets to be achieved based on the expected
performance of the available technology. This study offered a method of calculating the
estimated ROI for adopting CFIT technology.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Research Approach and Design
A review of the relevant literature supports the researcher’s use of an expanded
version of the formulas employed by Johnson and Avers (2012) in the ROI calculator for
human factors safety interventions, ROI = [(Net Returns / Benefits) - Investment (Cost)] /
(Investment Cost), and by Bank et al. (2009) for calculating the expected ROI for the
utilization of PHM technology where ROI = [(Benefit Gain - Technology Cost) /
Technology Cost] to estimate the potential ROI that can be achieved when rotorcraft
CFIT-avoidance technology is broadly adopted. In research by the Department of
Transport (2011), the benefits were considered to be the accident costs avoided with the
installation of TAWS, and this study considered the same for the rotorcraft industry.
These costs can be estimated by using the relevant NLR (2001) report cost categories as
done by Cavka and Čokorilo (2012) and Čokorilo et al. (2010). Additionally, the
adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology is considered a SMS risk mitigation measure,
and costs avoided can be estimated by applying decision analysis as done by Stewart and
Muller for aviation security (2013) and airport security (2014). The expanded formula,
which accounts for the cost savings likely to be realized with a reduction of the CFIT
accident rate, is represented as Equation 1.
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where:
Net Benefits = Accident costs avoided through the adoption of CFITavoidance technology.
Safety Technology Costs = Costs associated with the integration and usage of
CFIT-avoidance technology on a rotorcraft.

The purpose of the study was to use historical rotorcraft accident reports and the
safety costs associated with the accident outcomes to estimate the potential ROI that can
be achieved if CFIT-avoidance technology is adopted more broadly. The study:
(a) identifies the outcomes of each CFIT-related accident (terrain, water, or obstacles
and wires) occurring between January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2015;
(b) quantifies the value of the direct and indirect costs associated with each accident;
(c) determines the CFIT accident rate over the period of study, based on the number
of CFIT accidents and flight hours accumulated;
(d) evaluates the CFIT accident rate (probability) with a reduction target range of
50% to 80%. The 50% target is based on the reduction observed in fixed-wing
operations from the three-year period between 2007 to 2009 and the three year
period between 2010 and 2012 (FAA, 2011). The 80% target is based on the
IHST reduction target for the overall rotorcraft accident rate (USJHST, 2010).
(e) quantifies the costs associated with adopting the CFIT-avoidance technology; and
(f) employs the appropriate ROI equation in a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the
potential ROI that can be achieved if the CFIT accident rate is reduced by the
50% to 80% levels previously described.
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This study employed a mixed methods research design performed in two phases.
In the first phase, a qualitative assessment of the CFIT-related accident reports retrieved
from the NTSB accident / incident database was performed to identify the accident
outcomes (injuries, deaths, damage, etc.). At the beginning of each accident report,
details of the accident that include: location, date and time, aircraft, aircraft registration,
regulations under which the flight was conducted, aircraft damage, and injuries were
provided. The injuries were categorized by severity to include fatalities. Within the
report, the probable cause and findings section was also reviewed to verify that the
accident was primarily a CFIT. The qualitative assessment was performed by the
researcher to identify the accidents to be included in the analysis. The NTSB reports,
based on subject matter experts’ analysis, identified the probable cause and findings and
provided a summary of the factual information with adequate detail for an individual with
some appreciable aviation experience to determine whether a CFIT occurred and without
the influence of factors such as mechanical or system failures. Since no further coding or
classification of the data for causal factors was required, it was considered that the use of
additional subject matter expert(s) was not necessary. The accident data from the
database, which included information already contained in the accident reports, was also
extracted into a Microsoft Excel® file for the calculation of the various accident safety
costs as described in detail herein. The classification of the rotorcraft by engine type was
done based on the manufacturer’s designation and using the Aircraft Bluebook from the
Aviation Week Network as a guide.
As part of the first phase, flight hours and fleet size data were retrieved from the
FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Year 2011-2031 and FY 2016-2036 reports (FAA,
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2017). The flight hours from the FY 2011-2031 report were used to calculate the
accident rates for the different rotorcraft categories. The hours from the FY 2016-2036
report were used to calculate the number of accidents that are likely to occur if the current
accident rate remains unchanged and when the targeted reduction of between 50% and
80% is achieved. The number of accidents avoided was used to calculate the accident
costs likely to be avoided for each rotorcraft category.
In the second phase, data searches and collection were performed to estimate the
costs associated with the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology. Data searches for
aircraft manufacturer, equipment vendor, and training centers’ catalogs, advertisements,
quotes, or websites were done. Costs to install, operate, and maintain the equipment were
considered. It was assumed that the equipment, when installed as part of an avionics
suite, would have the capability to provide the pilot with the information that all four
CFIT-avoidance technologies recommended in the NLR (2014) report would provide.
For each piece of equipment, the costs to install, operate, and maintain it were collected.
These costs were then averaged for each type of equipment and used for determining the
technology adoption costs for all the identified CFIT-avoidance equipment. The cost
estimates generated in both phases are combined to calculate the ROI with Equation 1.
The graphical representation of the study’s design is depicted in Figure 4.
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Figure 5. Return on investment research process.
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Accident Safety Costs
Using the data retrieved for the variables listed in Table 4 and the criteria in Table
5, the direct and indirect aircraft safety costs associated with the outcomes of the
accidents for each accident were evaluated. The cost category criteria applied were
drawn from the NLR (2001) Aviation Safety Targets for Effective Regulation report
together with the appropriate assumptions on aircraft accidents and safety costs as applied
in studies previously described herein and referenced as Rotorcraft Comments in Table 5.

Table 4
Accident Data Variables Utilized in Aircraft Safety Costs Evaluation
Variable
Make

Aircraft Safety Costs
Aircraft category

Data Type
Qualitative

Model

Aircraft category

Qualitative

Engine Type

Aircraft category

Qualitative

Number of Engines

Aircraft category: turboshaft single or

Quantitative

piston, turbine single, turbine twin, or heavy
(based on number of engines and
manufacturer’s or industry’s classification).
Aircraft Damage

Aircraft physical damage and loss of resale

Qualitative

value (destroyed, substantial, or minor)
Total Fatal Injuries

Deaths and Injuries, Fatal

Quantitative

Total Serious Injuries

Deaths and Injuries, Serious

Quantitative

Total Minor Injuries

Deaths and Injuries, Minor

Quantitative

Total Uninjured

Deaths and Injuries, None

Quantitative
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Table 5
Aircraft Safety Costs Criteria and Variable Name
Direct Costs
Cost Category

Aircraft
physical
damage

Possible loss of
resale value

Aircraft loss of
use

Aircraft loss of
investment
return
Site
contamination
and clearance
Airline costs
for delay

ASTER Cost Description
ASTER Handbook:
Minor (15% damage)
Moderate (50% damage)
Major (80% damage)
Disaster (100% damage)
Catastrophic (100%
damage);
Percentages based on
analysis of past accidents
for larger aircrafts and are
adopted for estimation
purposes only.

5-10% of aircraft market
value (for partial losses)

Monthly lease cost x
assumed months to
replace
Part of aircraft loss of use

Wide body: 1.2-2.8 M€
Narrow body: 0. 7-1.3 M€
Smaller aircraft: 0.13-0.2
M€
Wide body: 22 € x
number of passengers on
flight

Rotorcraft Comments
For this analysis, the
ASTER and NTSB
categories are paired as
follows:
 Minor/Moderate:
Minor
 Major: Substantial
 Disaster/Catastrophic:
Destroyed.
The costs are based on the
market value of rotorcraft
at time off accident.
Applicable only to aircraft
with minor damage and
substantial damage
(Čavka & Čokorilo,
2012). Costs will be
based on 5% of market
value of rotorcraft at
accident date.
Mid-size single engine
rotorcraft (e.g. Bell 407)
monthly lease of $85,000
(Fadali, Griswold,
Packham, & Harris,
2011).
Part of rotorcraft loss of
use

Variable
CD

Costs are incurred by the
local or state emergency
departments. Considered
societal costs and not cost
to operator.
Rotorcraft operations
differ from airlines as
majority of flights are

N/A

CR

CL

N/A

N/A
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Narrow body: 20 € x
number of passengers on
flight
Airport disruption
depends on severity of the
accident.
Airport closure
Only applicable if
accident occurs on or
close to the runway.

Deaths and
injuries

Loss of staff
investment

Loss of
baggage

Indirect Costs
Cost Category

Value of a Statistical Life
(VOSL): 1-2.64 M€
VOSL differs per country.
Value of injury is 13% of
VOSL.

Replacement cost per
pilot: 45000 €

Underfloor cargo carried
on passenger flights:
110000 €
Personal baggage on
passenger flights: 45000 €
Cost Description

Search and
Rescue (SAR)
costs

Average SAR costs: 0.6
M€

Airline
immediate
response

Average costs per
accident: 0.5-3 M€

Cost of
accident
investigation

State: 0.1-100 M€
Airline: 1 M€
Manufacturer: 1 M€

non-scheduled and
therefore delays will be
considered to incur
negligible costs.
Rotorcraft CFIT accidents
usually do not occur near
the airport, and therefore
airport closure costs will
be considered negligible.
VOSL: $9.4 million.
Value of injury, refer to
Table 3 (Department of
Transport, 2015).
Replacement costs for a
rotorcraft pilot are
difficult to determine.
With an aircraft pilot
average pay of $119,360
(BLS, 2016), the
replacement costs are
estimated to be $179,040
(1.5 times the average
pay).
Due to limited baggage
space on rotorcrafts, these
costs will be considered
negligible.

N/A

CF and CI

CP

N/A

Rotorcraft Comments
Variable
According to Čavka &
CIN
Čokorilo (2012), indirect
safety costs are difficult to
estimate and predict and
therefore recommend a
percentage of the direct
costs, depending on the
type of accident and injury
classification.
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Third party
damage

Loss of
investment
income
Increased cost
of insurance

Loss of
reputation

 minor: 5-15%
(minor);
 moderate: 25-40%;
 major: 50-70%;
 disaster: 85-110%;
 catastrophic:90-140%
These costs are reflected
Due to the variability
in insurance premiums
observed in indirect costs
in previous research, an
Loss of 20% insurance
indirect-to-direct cost ratio
discount for airline
is usually recommended.
involved
Based on research by
Airline loss of turnover: 0- Manuele (2011) and
OSHA (2007), a ratio of
380 M€ (Huge range.
indirect to direct costs of
Loss to society is far less
than to airline, since major 1:1 will be applied for this
study.
part of reduced demand
will shift to other airlines.)
Third party death and
injury: use similar VOSL
as in passenger death and
injury + third party
physical damage

Manufacturer (Likely that
airlines will buy aircraft
from other
manufacturers.)
Note. Adapted from “Aviation Safety Targets for Effective Regulation, a Consolidated
Report,” National Aerospace Laboratory, NLR, 2001. Modified to add rotorcraft
comments and define study variable.

Aircraft physical damage. The damage to an aircraft varies by the type of
accident and its interaction with the environment at the time. According to the NLR
report (2001), the severity of the accidents included in their research model that involved
CFIT were found to be catastrophic in nature. This is an indication that a CFIT is more
likely to result in the loss of the aircraft whether on impact with the terrain or by the
resulting post-crash fire. To determine the value of the damage, the value of a similar
aircraft at the time of the crash was retrieved from the industry’s current primary sources
of the data, the HeliValue$, Inc. Helicopter Blue Book, or Aircraft BlueBook and
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multiplied by the percentage associated with the level of damage as expressed by
Equation 2.

CD = Aircraft Value * Damage Percentage (severity based)

(2)

Possible loss of resale value. Collisions with obstacles such as transmission
poles, wires, and towers that do not result in the loss of the aircraft require the operator to
incur restoration costs. Čavka & Čokorilo (2012) have recommended estimating a loss in
value of 5 percent on its value on the date of the accident. The value of the aircraft at that
point was determined from the HeliValue$, Inc. Helicopter Blue Book or Aircraft
Bluebook.

CR = Aircraft Value * 0.05

(3)

Aircraft loss of use. After an accident, an aircraft assessed to have experienced
minor, moderate, or major damage is transferred to a facility for repairs. The
unavailability of the aircraft will necessitate the leasing of another aircraft for the
organization to meet its operational needs. The lease period is dependent on the extent of
the damage to the aircraft under repair and type of aircraft. The costs associated with the
lease can be estimated with Equation 4.

CL = Monthly Lease * Number of months

(4)
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The monthly lease costs will vary based on the aircraft type, age of the aircraft, and other
conditions as determined by the lessor. For the study, the average monthly lease cost was
determined by aircraft category and based on rates sourced from current aircraft leasing
companies and applicable literature.
Death and injuries. A review of existing literature and current practices in
various countries shows that the Value of a Statistical Life (VOSL) has been used when
estimating the compensatory costs for occupational deaths and injuries. The safety costs
associated with a fatality (CF) were set at the 2015 VSOL level of $9.4 million and that of
an injury, at the value evaluated with the application of the relative disutility factor to the
VOSL. The relative disutility factor, previously given in Table 3, was based on injury
severity as set by the U.S. Department of Transport (2015).
Loss of staff investment. In addition to the costs related to death and injury
incurred in an aircraft accident, the operator is likely to incur additional costs for the
replacement of crew. Replacement costs include the advertising, recruitment,
interviewing, screening, hiring, management, and effective training of a pilot to
accomplish the same duties as the deceased pilot. Due to the limited literature on the cost
incurred when hiring a replacement rotorcraft, research on other fields was done.
According to Boushey and Glynn (2012) of the Center for American Progress (CAP), the
cost of replacing an employee earning $75,000 or less annually is approximately 20.4%
of the base salary and 21.4% when all employees from the case studies reviewed are
considered.
Applebaum and Milkman (2006) determined that high paying jobs at senior or
executive levels tend to have high replacement costs as a percentage of the salary. They
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found that for a lower level executive at a consumer products company’s corporate
headquarters earning $125,000 dollars, the replacement cost is about $185,000. For a
middle level manager earning $50,000 to $125,000, the cost ranged from $98,000 to
$117,000. At a client services company, replacement costs were found to be about 1.5
times the base salary of an employee earning over $100,000. Considering the specialized
training required for rotorcraft pilots and the estimated average pay for an aircraft pilot
being $119,360 (BLS, 2016), this study employed a replacement cost of $179,040. This
was equivalent to 1.5 times the average pay of a pilot.
Indirect costs. Unlike the direct costs, indirect costs (CIN) are the hidden costs
that result from internal systems of the organization adapting to the accident. According
to the U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) (2007), indirect costs
refer to the production time lost by the employee, fellow workers, and supervisors;
unhappy customers; cleanup time; schedule delays; training new employees; overhead
costs; legal fees; and increase in insurance costs. The costs identified in the ASTER
report (NLR, 2001) and considered as indirect costs in previous research are difficult to
estimate as are those identified by OSHA.
To facilitate the evaluation of safety costs, researchers have adopted an indirect to
direct costs ratio, and they vary greatly. OSHA has a ratio of 1-to-1.1 when direct costs
exceed $10,000 while Čavka & Čokorilo (2012) range the costs from 5 to 140 percent,
dependent on the accident severity. Scuffham et al. (2002), using the Human Capital
(HC) approach assigned a ratio of 1-to-4.9 and with the Willingness to Pay (WTP)
approach assigned a ratio of 1-to-5.41 for accidents in New Zealand. Manuele (2011), in
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his quest to find a more reliable ratio, evaluated the different methods and sources used to
determine the ratios found in existing literature.
A study by Manuele (2011) found that in some cases the ratios were based on
decades-old data that do not reflect the growth of direct costs at a higher rate than indirect
costs in recent times. Examples of the ratios included the 4:1 recommended by the
Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters (Ontario Division) and Workplace Safety and
Insurance Board in The Business Results Through Health and Safety Guidebook, ASSE’s
Journal of SH&E Research in which Choi (2006) suggested indirect costs were two to 20
times the direct costs, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service noted that $4 to $10 were spent
on indirect costs for every dollar of direct costs, and the International Safety Equipment
Association’s estimated indirect costs were up to 30 times the direct costs. He opined
that safety practitioners have commonly used the ratio 4:1 for indirect to direct costs of
accidents to inform management on total accident costs and there was a need to rethink
the ratio. It was observed that the ratio reduced as the direct costs continued to increase.
Manuel (2011), using the available data, updated the calculations in the Stanford
University’s Department of Civil Engineering 1981 Technical Report No. 260 to the
Business Roundtable and determined that a ratio of 0.8:1 of indirect to direct costs was
more appropriate. He also argued that a safety professional assuming a ratio of 1:1 can
be reasonably comfortable with it and should avoid using higher ratios for which
supporting data is not available. Based on the research done by Manuele (2011) and
OSHA (2007), this study applied a ratio of 1:1.
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Safety costs (CA) for each rotorcraft accident were calculated by totaling the costs
in the different categories identified with the variables in Table 5 and as expressed with
Equation 5.

CA = (CD + CR + CL + CF + CI + CP + CIN)

(5)

For a detailed evaluation of the expected ROI for CFIT accidents, the safety costs
were evaluated with the assumption that the pieces of equipment are adopted within an
integrated avionics suite with the capability to mitigate collision with terrain and objects
such as wires, transmission towers, and poles. The goal of the IHST at its creation in
2005 was to reduce the number of accidents worldwide 80% by 2016. Current data
shows that since 2006, an accident reduction of 24 percent to up to more than 50 percent
has been achieved in key global regions, while the accident rate has decreased within a
range of 40 to 60 percent. During this time, the worldwide fleet also grew by 30 percent
(IHST, 2016).
In the fixed-wing world, as previously stated, CFIT accidents were reduced by
80% when TAWS was adopted and implemented. Aiming to achieve the same success as
the fixed-wing segment, the probability of a CFIT occurring after the CFIT-avoidance
technology has been adopted will be expected to reduce 20 to 80 percent from current
accident levels. The probability of an accident (accident rate) during the period under
consideration was determined by applying Equation 6.
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(6)

The historical flight hours data for U.S. rotorcraft data over the same period were sourced
from the USHST, the FAA, and the ASCEND database.
The calculated accident rate (probability) and accident safety costs were utilized
to determine the estimated safety costs (CS) that can be avoided as the CFIT-avoidance
technology is adopted more broadly as mitigation for the accidents. Costs avoided with
this risk mitigation strategy within a safety management system perspective were
estimated by applying Equation 7.

CS = CA * PCFIT *ΔR*FHs

(7)

where:
PCFIT = Probability of a CFIT-accident occurring.
ΔR = Reduction in CFIT-accident probability. Probability is expected to
gradually decrease as the number of aircraft with the technology increases.
FHs=Projected fleet flight hours (January 2107 through December 2026).

Net Benefit. In a cost-benefit analysis, the established evaluation of the monetary
difference between the pros (benefits) and cons (costs) on the implementation of a project
or activity is termed as the net benefit (Guzman & Asgari, 2014). An ROI analysis in the
same manner considers all tangible costs and benefits. By adopting CFIT-avoidance
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technology, the industry is expected to see a reduction in (or avoid) the accident safety
costs being currently experienced. The net benefit for adopting collision avoidance
equipment can be expressed as:

Net Benefit = (CS – CT)

(8)

where:
CT = Technology adoption costs.

Technology Adoption Costs
The adoption of rotorcraft safety technology, like any other technology, comes
with costs. The costs are of two types: (1) non-recurring costs that include the initial cost
of the equipment, its installation, and initial training for the users, and (2) recurring
operational costs over the equipment’s lifecycle (e.g. maintenance and proficiency training).
To evaluate the costs that an operator is likely to experience, requests for information were
made to the aircraft manufacturers, equipment vendors, and training centers on the current
rates they were charging for the various services. Additionally, an analysis of the available
pricing data from the catalogs, advertisements, vendor quotes, or websites of the equipment
manufacturers and vendors was done. With the components being currently available to
customers, it was assumed that the pricing associated with the acquisition and installation of
the equipment has factored in the research and development costs and profit margins. These
cost estimates should account for variability in pricing for the manufacturers or vendors
(Department of Transport, 2013; Johnson & Avers, 2012). The CFIT-avoidance technology
adoption costs, denoted as CT, were determined by employing Equation 9.
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CT = (CE + CI + CT + CM)

(9)

where:
CE = Equipment acquisition costs.
CI = Equipment installation costs.
CT = Training costs for users.
CM = Recurrent maintenance costs.

The equipment under consideration for this study will have the capability to
provide information on terrain, altitude, weather, and obstacles (transmission lines, masts,
towers, structures, etc.). For example, an avionics suite with EGPWS/HTAWS that
integrates obstacle data from a warning database system such as WireWatch® will be
considered a comprehensive solution to mitigating CFIT accidents. According to Connor
(2014), the leading avionics producers: Sandel, Garmin, and Honeywell, have created
HTAWS equipment capable of producing warnings to pilots on wires, cables, and power
lines when integrated into a helicopter’s avionics suite. From these manufacturers, three
types of HTAWS equipment will be considered: Sandel ST3400H-001 HeliTAWS,
Garmin HTAWS 010-HTAWS-00, and Honeywell Mark XXI or XXII. Using data
collected from the manufacturers, vendors, and approved installers, the technology
adoption costs (CT) for the equipment will be analyzed to determine the range for costs
over which an operator is likely to incur to acquire and use any of the technology.
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ROI Estimation
For the second phase, a Monte Carlo simulation was performed to estimate the
ROI based on the selected criteria. The Monte Carlo Method or simulation was selected
as a means of visualizing all the possible outcomes of the decisions that are made on the
adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology. The Monte Carlo simulation is a computerized
mathematical technique that allows one to account for risk in quantitative analysis and
decision making and has been employed widely in the engineering, finance, and aviation
industry projects (Blom, de Jong, & NLR, 2006; Henry, Schmitz, Kelbaugh, & Revenko,
2013; Wang, Chang, & El-Sheikh, 2012). The estimated ROI from the simulation will be
based on Equation 1 which has been expanded with the safety cost categories.
Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation was performed in Microsoft Excel®.
The variation represented by the possible reduction in the probability of occurrence of a
CFIT accident, the technology adoption costs (CT), and the aircraft safety costs (CS)
incurred in an accident influenced the ROI. To perform the simulation, the three
variables applied in the ROI analysis were calculated and their ranges defined with a
frequency distribution. The distribution for each variable was determined from the
descriptive statistics. The CS were calculated as a product of the number of accidents
avoided with a reduction in the accident rate and the accident costs (CA). The ROI values
were calculated with the CS and CT as uncontrollable probabilistic inputs. The
probability of a CFIT accident occurring was determined by the number of incidents
divided by the flight hours accumulated over the given period of interest. A reduction of
this probability by up to 80% when CFIT-avoidance technology is adapted was assumed
to be in line with reduction achieved in the fixed-wing segment and target set by the
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JHST for all rotorcraft accidents. The technology adoption costs, calculated using data
from different vendors, suppliers, and manufacturers, were evaluated to determine the
distribution using the descriptive statistics: minimum, median, and maximum values.
In the spreadsheet simulation setup, the initial conditions for the variables of each
aircraft category: the rotorcraft accident costs, current CFIT-accident rate, projected flight
hours for the period 2017-2026, and the technology adoption costs were added. Using
the projected flight hours and accident rate, the number of accidents that are likely to be
avoided was calculated. The accident rate value was randomly selected based on a 50 to
80 percent reduction of the current accident rate. This value was then multiplied with the
CA to generate the CS value. The CS value and a randomly selected CT value were
applied in the ROI formula. The process was repeated over 5,000 iterations in each
simulation run to ensure that all possible values of CS and CT likely to be experienced
with a 50 to 80 percent accident rate reduction with 25 to 75 percent of the fleet installing
the CFIT-avoidance technology equipment were considered. For each rotorcraft
category, the simulation was run several times and the results evaluated for consistency.
The resulting ROI values were used to generate frequency distributions and boxplots to
display the range over which operators or the industry are likely to achieve the ROI with
the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology.
Population/Sample
The population for the study consisted of all accident reports on U.S. general
aviation rotorcraft accidents that were determined to have resulted in a CFIT as defined
for this study. The accidents considered occurred in the time period between January 1,
2005, and December 31, 2015. The accident reports considered had a finalized status
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identifying the probable cause and safety recommendations, where applicable. The start
of the time period was selected to mark the 10-year period in which accident
investigations for the accidents were expected to be complete and prior to the FAA
mandated date for all HAA rotorcraft to have GPWS/TAWs installed.
Sources of the Data
The source of data was the NTSB accident / incident database which is considered
the official U.S. government repository of the aviation accident reports generated from
NTSB investigations. The study was limited to those events that were considered an
accident, which by definition is an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft
which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of
flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or
serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage (NTSB, 2013). The
reports were grouped into three categories based on their status: preliminary, factual, and
probable cause with the latter providing a detailed description of the accident and
identifying the causal factors. The reports were also used to verify the accident
outcomes, operations category by FAR, weather conditions, and rotorcraft information as
retrieved from the NTSB Microsoft Access® database. The Helivalue$ Inc. Bluebook
and the Aviation Week Network Aircraft Bluebook were utilized for determining the
value of the rotorcraft at the time of the accident. To determine the CFIT-avoidance
technology adoption costs, the relevant data by category were acquired from the
equipment manufacturer and vendor websites, marketing material, industry publications,
and related material through appropriate data searches.
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Data Collection
The data required for the study was acquired from the NTSB Microsoft Access®
database with the various coded information fields and downloaded to a Microsoft Excel®
spreadsheet. The spreadsheet was modified with the addition of new fields for Aircraft
Category (turboshaft or piston single, turbine single, turbine twin, and heavy) and
Accident Type (Terrain or Obstacle). The accident reports in Portable Document Format
(PDF) were retrieved and, together with the rotorcraft manufacturers’ product data
specification information, were also used to complete the fields. To retrieve the data, a
search was performed through the NTSB accident database web search engine using key
words and phrases that included: CFIT, terrain, obstacles, water, wires, wire strike, power
line, and transmission lines. The reports were reviewed to determine if the accident met
the criteria of a CFIT accident and was applicable to the study. For example, accidents
resulting from a system failure or loss of control in flight were excluded.
To determine the safety costs associated with each accident, new fields were
added for each safety cost category identified and calculated by applying the appropriate
formulas and the values in Table 5. For each rotorcraft category, the descriptive analysis
was performed, calculating the minimum, mean, median, and maximum values. The
analysis function in the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was used to perform the analysis.
The data required for the CFIT-avoidance technology adoption costs were
acquired from the equipment manufacturer and vendor websites, marketing material,
industry publications, and related material through appropriate data searches. The data
was transferred into a Microsoft Excel® spreadsheet and the costs determined by applying
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the appropriate formulas. The data analysis function in the spreadsheet was used to
perform the analysis.
Determining the probability or the accident rate of a CFIT accident was based on
the number of hours flown by the commercial U.S. rotorcraft fleet. This information was
retrieved from the FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Year 2011-2031 and 2016-2036
(FAA, 2017). The flight hours and number of accidents for each rotorcraft category were
used to calculate the accident rate using Equation 6.
Reliability. The reliability of a study refers to the ability for one to obtain the
same results in a consistent and repeatable manner. NTSB reports have been repeatedly
used for various studies as the information provided by them is considered reliable, and
reports follow a common reporting format. The report’s narrative, probable cause and
findings plus wreckage and impact information, was used to classify the accident as
terrain or obstacle related. The accident reports in some cases though do not clearly state
the primary cause when multiple causes or contributory factors were identified.
Accidents were determined to be CFITs if the pilot still had control of the rotorcraft when
collision with the terrain or obstacle occurred. Due to the population size, sampling was
not done, and all reports were used for the analysis. The ASTER report has been used in
previous studies and is considered reliable for defining the cost categories associated with
aircraft accidents. The report was the work product of the ASTER Consortium led by the
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR with input from select industry regulators and
partners. Aircraft historical values and categories from the Helivalue$ Inc. Bluebook and
the Aviation Week Network Aircraft Bluebook have been consistently used in the
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industry for varying analysis. The ROI methodology has been used in various forms in
the transport industry and is adapted to the rotorcraft segment for this study.
Validity. The validity of a study refers to whether one is measuring what has
been defined as the subject matter being measured. Internal validity was established by
using a proven ROI formula that has been applied in various industries including aviation
by CASR and FAA. The formula was modified for use in this study with variables (cost
categories) defined in the NLR ASTER reports and applied in aircraft safety costs
research on the Airbus A320. The ROI formula applied for the study can also be used for
other aviation safety studies where determining the costs and benefits of equipment or
technology acquisition is required. The external validity of the study, which refers to the
ability to generalize the results to the entire population, was not considered a concern
since the study employs the entire population of CFIT accidents. The derived ROI
estimation methodology went beyond the cost-benefit evaluation of accident costs
avoided by adopting safety technology, and its results advise the industry on the
estimated value created by doing so. The methodology can be applied for other transport
sector initiatives such as automotive safety and transport security equipment.
Content validity was established by utilizing the NTSB safety reports to
determine whether the cause of the accident was a CFIT related to collision with terrain
or obstacles. In cases where more than one probable cause of the accident may be
identified, the CFIT should be the primary failure. The CFIT should not have been the
result of a different preceding factor such as structural, system, or engine failure.
Additionally, the Helivalue$ Inc. Bluebook and the Aviation Week Network Aircraft
Bluebook were used to determine the rotorcraft category and values. These resources
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have been used in the industry for years for this purpose. By limiting the reports to the
specified period between January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2015, consideration
was given to a period where EGPWS / TAWS were available for use in some form and
when the mandate had not been implemented.
Treatment of the Data
The data related to rotorcraft CFIT accidents for the period of interest was
downloaded from the NTSB Microsoft Access® aircraft accident database to a Microsoft
Excel® spreadsheet by performing a search using key words and phrases that included:
CFIT, terrain, obstacles, water, wires, wire strike, power line, and transmission lines.
The spreadsheet was edited to retain the data fields shown in Table 4. More data fields
were added to facilitate the calculation of the aircraft safety costs represented by the
variables in Table 5 and to identify the different categories of the rotorcrafts:
reciprocating single / piston, turbine single, and turbine twin. The accident reports were
reviewed to determine if the accident was primarily a CFIT accident not the consequence
of another cause such as mechanical failure. The report’s narrative, probable cause,
findings, wreckage, and impact information was used to classify the accident as a CFIT
and identify the outcomes such as fatalities, injuries, non-injuries, and airframe damage.
A second spreadsheet created for the calculation of technology adoption costs had
fields for: the technology nomenclature, the equipment cost, training costs, installation
costs, and recurring maintenance costs. The addition of more fields was dependent on
additional cost categories that were determined critical to the adoption of the technology.
The quantitative data was acquired from the equipment manufacturer and vendor
websites, marketing material, industry publications, and related material through
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appropriate data searches. Using the data analysis function in the spreadsheet, the
descriptive statistics were generated.
Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics were used in the study to determine
the distribution of the variables for calculating the ROI: accident costs (CA) and
Technology costs (CT). The CS was calculated by multiplying the accident costs (CA)
with the number of accidents likely to be avoided with the adoption of the safety
technology. Descriptive statistics were also used to gain an understanding of the
individual cost categories of the accident costs. For the Monte Carlo simulation, a
random value was selected from each variable’s distribution, and the ROI was evaluated
and results recorded. Multiple iterations of this calculation were performed with different
randomly-selected values. The results of the ROI, in the form of a distribution, were used
to describe the estimated ROI that can be achieved as the probability of a CFIT changes
over time as a result of adopting the CFIT-avoidance technology.
Qualitative data. The qualitative data for the study were extracted from the
NTSB accident investigation reports to advise the probable cause of the accidents. The
probable cause and findings section of the accident reports documented all the causes.
The accident reports with a CFIT outcome were retained and analyzed to determine that
the CFIT was the primary probable cause or one of the probable causes and not a
secondary outcome after a different cause such as mechanical failure. The qualitative
data did not require further classification or coding as the accident outcomes and
probable cause(s) were already determined by the NTSB accident investigators. A
column was added in the spreadsheet in which the CFIT accidents were further
categorized as obstacle, terrain, or wire-strike based on the report narrative. The review
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of the qualitative data ensured that only CFIT accidents were considered and grouped by
the correct rotorcraft category, thereby improving the accuracy of the model. Rotorcraft
categories were assigned based on the Helivalue$ Inc. Bluebook, Aviation Week
Network Aircraft Bluebook, and the rotorcraft OEM grouping of each aircraft.
This mixed methods study used historical CFIT-related accident reports to
identify accident outcomes and estimate the associated accident costs while also
collecting available data to estimate the technology adoption costs to estimate the
potential ROI that could be achieved when CFIT-avoidance technology is broadly
adopted. The accident cost categories were based off categories used in previous
research by Čavka & Čokorilo (2012) and modified for rotorcraft. The ROI formula, which
is a ratio of the net benefits to the costs incurred to achieve those benefits was applied. The
net benefits were calculated as the accident costs avoided by adopting the technology while
the costs represented the costs likely to be incurred when acquiring, installing, and operating
the equipment. The ROI results were generated as multiple iterations of a Monte Carlo
simulation. The study considered different categories of rotorcraft and the results for each

are discussed in the following section.

77
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The purpose of this study was to estimate the potential ROI that could be achieved
if the readily available CFIT-avoidance technology is more widely adopted by the
helicopter industry and a reduction in the accident rate was achieved. Accident reports
were analyzed to determine whether they were CFIT related, based on FAA’s (2003)
definition of a CFIT accident as one that occurs when an airworthy aircraft is flown,
under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain, water surface, or obstacles, with
inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot of the impending collision. In addition, the
costs associated with the accident outcomes were evaluated, based on the applicable
categories defined in Chapter 3. The accident reports examined were those from the time
period between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2015.
Treatment of the Data and Procedures
Accident reports were retrieved from the NTSB aviation accident database and
used for this study (NTSB, 2017). To determine which reports were to be analyzed,
queries using key search words were performed in the Microsoft Access® database for
helicopter accidents within the period of interest. Terms used included: (a) CFIT, (b)
(H)TAWS, (c) wire strike, (d) terrain /ground (e) obstacles, (f) water, (g) power and
transmission lines, (h) ground proximity, and (i) radar/radio altimeter. The data returned
from the queries were downloaded as Extensible Markup language (XML) files which
were subsequently imported into a Microsoft Excel® file. A total of 1,760 records were
imported.
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The merged records were further reviewed by the researcher for quality (missing
data) and to determine those to be retained for the analysis. The review revealed that the
use of multiple search terms resulted in duplicate records for the same accident.
Microsoft Excel® data tools were used to delete the duplicate records by comparing
entries in the Event ID category of variables, reducing the number to 256. The accident
reports, in PDF format, associated with these records were retrieved. For each report, the
probable cause and findings were reviewed by the researcher to determine if the accident
was CFIT related based on the analysis of the accident investigators. To facilitate the
tracking of accidents that were to be excluded from the analysis, a new variable Accident
Type was added. Accidents determined to be non-CFIT in the following categories were
eliminated: (a) loss of control in flight, (b) loss of engine power, (c) dynamic rollover, (d)
external load event, (e) mechanical failure, (f) in-flight collision, and (g) hard landing. A
detailed look at the aircraft make and model showed that 16 were ex-military aircraft, for
example, the UH-1 and OH-58 variants. These aircraft were remanufactured by an
independent organization (not original equipment manufacturers). These aircraft were
excluded from the analysis due to the limited information on the configuration and CFITavoidance equipment that would be appropriate for installation.
For the analysis, the technology adoption costs were evaluated with data collected
from equipment manufacturer and vendor websites, marketing material, industry
publications, and related material as needed. The accident costs were evaluated based on
the set criteria for each category in 2016 U.S. dollars. Since future accident occurrence
and equipment installation could not be attributed to a specific year within the ten-year
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period, the evaluation was based on the 2016 values. Therefore, general inflation or the
aircraft and CTIF-avoidance equipment price inflation were not part of the evaluation.
Descriptive Statistics
A total of 112 accident records were retained and classified into three Accident
Type categories: (1) CFIT, (2) CFIT-obstacle, and (3) wire strike. The categorization of
the accidents in this manner allowed for the use of the CFIT-obstacle category to capture
all non-terrain or wire collision related accidents in one group, for example, collision
with poles, lighted tower, and highway markers. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the
CFIT accidents, based on the prevailing weather conditions. Wire-strikes were the most
prevalent. From the accident reports it was observed that in some accidents the pilots had
an initial awareness of the presence of wires, and by losing sight of their location the
rotorcraft wound up in a collision.
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Figure 6. Accident type by weather condition.
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The accident aircraft make, model, and engine type were used to categorize each into one
of three groups: (1) Reciprocating or piston (light singles), (2) Turboshaft / Turbine
single (light singles), and (3) Turboshaft twin or multi-engine turbine. The light singles
were separated into turboshaft and reciprocating in order to better reflect the variation in
accident and technology adoption costs. Turboshaft single category rotorcraft were found
to have the highest number of accidents at 56, followed by the piston category with 46,
and twin turbine with 10. Fifty-four percent of the analyzed CFIT accidents were fatal.
Accidents involving piston rotorcraft were 67 percent fatal and 41 percent of single
turbine accidents were fatal. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of the accident aircraft
by make and model and Figure 8 displays aircraft by engine type.
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Figure 7. Accident count by aircraft make and model.
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Accident by Yr and Engine Type
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Figure 8. Accident by year and engine type.

The types of operations conducted at the time of the CFIT-related accident
occurred were identified by the Purpose of Flight variable. From the review of the data
records in Excel®, it was noted that the purpose of the flight was either missing or the
description was generic. For the analysis, the Purpose of Flight descriptors such as Other
work use and Positioning, where possible, were changed to provide a clearer indicator of
the operation, while any missing ones were added. Aerial application and observation
was used to group different low altitude operations including power line surveillance,
crop dusting, crop freezing prevention, cherry drying, and film or television production.
Public aircraft represents operations performed by government owned aircraft or aircraft
leased or contracted from the private sector for non-law enforcement purposes. Aerial
operations, personal, and HAA aircraft were the predominant operations during the
occurrence of a CFIT related accident. The distribution of the accidents by the Purpose
of Flight is shown in Figure 9.
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Accidents by Purpose of Flight
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Figure 9. Accidents by purpose of flight.

The Purpose of Flight provides insight into the diverse operations that are
undertaken by operators but not into the regulatory requirements the operators would
have been required to meet. Rotorcraft are required to have specific equipment based on
the operations they intend to perform and to do so in a safe manner. An analysis of the
Federal Air Regulations Description (FAR Description) variable was done to identify
under which regulations the operations were being performed and are shown in Figure
10.
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Accidents by FAR Description
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Figure 10. Accidents by FAR description.

Accident costs. To estimate the costs rotorcraft operators were likely to
experience as a result of a CFIT accidents, columns were added to the Excel® spreadsheet
for each cost variable identified in Table 5 (See Appendix A). Since the extracted data
did not distinguish between pilot, passenger, or cabin crew fatalities, a column for pilot
fatalities was added to separate them. Upon separation, the pilot fatalities were used to
determine the pilot replacement costs (CP) at a rate of $179,040 which was 1.5 times the
average pay for a pilot in 2016 (BLS, 2016). In their research, Applebaum and Milkman
(2006) determined that the replacement costs of employees making over $100,000 was
1.5 times the base salary. The aircraft damage costs (CD) and loss in resale value (CR)
were evaluated using the market-based value of the rotorcraft in 2016 U.S. dollars. The
aircraft model, series, and serial number were used to identify an aircraft within the same
serial number range in the Helivalue$ Inc. Blue Book and its value. Where the
Helivalue$ data was not available, the Aircraft Bluebook® value was used. These two
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sources are considered the rotorcraft industry’s primary references of aircraft residual
value for any given year.
The loss of use (CL) cost was evaluated on the basis of an aircraft’s category
(engine type and size). All turbine singles were assigned the $85,000 monthly lease cost
of a mid-size single engine rotorcraft, as previously given in Table 5. A monthly lease
cost of $42,500 for piston singles and $212,500 for medium (twin-engine) rotorcraft were
used for the simulation. The lease rates were estimated using the ratio of direct operating
cost (DOC) of the Bell 47G (piston) and Bell 412SP (twin turbine) to the Bell 407 as
evaluated in Conklin & de Decker’s Aircraft Cost Evaluator (ACE). The DOC is
considered a significant contributor to leasing costs and therefore can be an effective way
of comparing operational costs of different rotorcraft. By comparing the DOCs, the ratio
was used to estimate the leasing costs of the piston and twin turbine rotorcraft. The
helicopter flight rate charts from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service
(2017) for helicopter services were used to validate the estimates. A conservative lease
period of twelve months was determined by evaluating rotorcraft lead times, the period of
time an operator would have to wait for a new or replacement aircraft from the
manufacturer’s production line. Aircraft lead times were found to range from 36 weeks
to over 12 months depending on the aircraft size and customization requirements
(Defence IQ, 2016; Duncan & Frank, 2007; Johnson, 2016;). In the meantime, a leased
aircraft would perform the desired operations. The costs related to deaths and injuries
and the indirect costs were also calculated. The accident costs, CA, a sum of all the listed
categories of costs for each accident was also calculated. Table 6 presents a summary of
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the accident costs for each category as analyzed for completeness, while Figure 11 shows
the distribution of the CA for each rotorcraft category as applied in the simulation model.

Table 6
Accident Cost Categories
R/C
Category
Piston

CD
CR
CL
CF
CI
CP
CIN
CA*

Min

Max

Mean

Std. Dev.

Count

20,250
0
67,560
0
0
0
110,060
220,120

364,800
22,800
125,400
37,600,000
1,974,000
358,080
37,994,540
75,989,080

104,079
5,509
93,965
6,947,826
282,613
77,843
7,511,836
15,023,672

57,011
4,241
29,129
9,593,279
537,545
104,412
9,609,346
19,218,693

46
46
46
46
46
46
46
46

TurbineSingle

CD
CR
CL
CF
CI
CP
CIN
CA*

139,200
2,240,000
0
85,250
1,020,000 1,020,000
0
47,000,000
0
2,961,000
0
179,040
1,196,100 49,482,540
2,392,200 98,965,080

515,028
25,818
1,020,000
9,064,286
501,557
63,943
11,190,631
22,381,263

393,409
23,087
0
13,167,846
879,645
86,565
13,110,815
26,221,629

56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56

TurbineTwin

CD
CR
CL
CF
CI
CP
CIN
CA*

432,000
2,560,000
0
160,000
669,600
1,173,600
0
37,600,000
0
987,000
0
179,040
1,627,460 40,302,520
3,254,920 80,605,040

1,419,900
52,650
952,890
18,800,000
197,400
107,424
21,530,264
43,060,528

784,505
62,961
171,780
17,161,973
416,156
92,456
16,897,601
33,795,203

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

Note. CD = Aircraft damage, CR = Resale value loss, CL = Loss of use (Leasing costs),
CF = Fatality/Death costs, CI = Injury costs, CP = Loss of staff (pilot replacement)
costs, CIN = Indirect costs, CA = Accident costs. Costs evaluated in 2016 U.S. dollars.
*Only CA values utilized in ROI simulation model.
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Figure 11. Rotorcraft accident costs, CA, distribution in millions.

Technology costs. Technology adoption costs were estimated using data
retrieved from the catalogs, advertisements, vendor quotes, or websites of the equipment
manufacturers and vendors. Rotorcraft manufacturers were also considered to be vendors
who retrofit the equipment in the fielded fleet and provide training as needed. In some
instances, to maintain a competitive advantage within the market, aircraft manufacturers and
vendors provided a combined value for equipment acquisition and installation (CE + CI).
Additionally, the equipment and aircraft manufacturers have suggested that recent
advancements in electronic equipment technology have made the components more reliable,
thereby minimizing the hardware maintenance costs.
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The equipment mean time between failures (MTBFs), provided by manufacturers
in the specifications, ranged from 4,850 to 10,000 hours. The hardware maintenance costs
claim was validated by applying the current recommended direct maintenance cost (DMC)
methodology provided in the Helicopter Association International’s Economic

Committee’s (2010) Guide for the Presentation of Helicopter Operating Cost Estimates
2010. With the equipment being repairable, the maintenance cost was approximately
15% of the average equipment cost of $14,692. Using the average MTBF of 7,425 hours,
the DMC is $0.30 per flight hour (FH). If the failure resulted in equipment being
scrapped, the replacement cost would be $2.08/FH. It was determined that the significant
maintenance costs likely to be incurred are for the software updates and therefore were
estimated for the life of the equipment.

No mandatory regulatory requirements for training on the new equipment were
found. Pilots can use inexpensive ways to familiarize themselves with the equipment
before using it as part of their recurrent and proficiency training. Familiarization could
range from reading manuals, computer-based training, simulator time, in-hangar
instruction, or flights, depending on complexity and costs (Mayhew, n.d.). Garmin offers
the GTN 650/750 familiarization courses for $625 to $795, depending on the training
location (Bergqvist, 2017). For the analysis, the cost of training materials and two
training flights was estimated to be $850 based on the evaluated average helicopter rental
rate. The total costs associated with the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology (CT)
were analyzed and summarized, as shown in Table 7. Installation costs assumed the
aircraft is configured to accept the new equipment, and no major overhaul of systems is
required. Due to its application being limited to military aircraft, the LOAS was not
included in the equipment analysis.
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Table 7
CFIT-avoidance Technology Adoption Costs
Equipment
Radar Altimeters
GRA™ 55 Radar Altimeter
GRA™ 5500 Radar Altimeter
RA-4000 Radar Altimeter
RA-4500 Radar Altimeter
King KRA 405B-15 Radar Altimeter

CE + C I

CM

CT

CT2

$9,096
$13,545
$18,878
$13,922
$16,699

$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

$850
$850
$850
$850
$850

$9,946
$14,395
$19,728
$14,772
$17,549

TAWS
Sandel ST3400H-001 HeliTAWS
Sandel ST3400H-001N
GTN-750 GPS/NAV/COM/ MFD HTAWS
Honeywell Mark XXI

$16,422
$18,797
$14,681
$21,765

$12,000
$10,200
$12,470
$5,000

$850
$850
$850
$850

$29,272
$29,847
$28,001
$27,615

$4,369

$12,470

$850

$17,689

$14,832

$12,470

$850

$28,152

$11,696

$12,470

$850

$25,016

$13,715

$9,950

$850

$24,515

$17,276

$9,950

$850

$28,076

Moving Maps
GDL-69A Sat. Weather Sys.
GTN 750 GPS/COM/NAV with MD200306 Indicator
GTN 650 GPS/COM/NAV with MD200306 Indicator
EX600 MFDs w/ Bendix/King
RDR2000/2100
FD540 TS GPS/NAV/COM w/ Wifi, &
FLTA/RTC, Blk

Note. CE = Equipment acquisition costs, CI = Equipment installation costs,
CM = Recurrent maintenance, CT = Training costs, CT2 = Technology adoption costs.
Costs evaluated in 2016 U.S. dollars.

Accident rate. To determine the number of accidents that can be potentially
avoided through the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology, the historical CFIT
accident rate for the period of interest, January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2015, was
determined. The rotorcraft fleet size and flight hours accumulated over the given period
were retrieved from the FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Year 2011-2031, Table 28
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(FAA, 2017). The CFIT accident rates for each rotorcraft category and all rotorcraft were
determined and are presented in Figure 12.

Figure 12. CFIT accident rate per 100,000 flight hours (2005 to 2015).

These accident rates, forecasted fleet size, and fleet hours, as detailed in the FAA
Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Year 2016-2036, Table 29 (FAA, 2017), were used to project
the number of CFIT related accidents that could potentially be incurred over the 10-year
period 2017 through 2026. Table 8 provides a summary of the flight hours and accidents.
Single and twin turbine hours were estimated using the historical fleet distribution where
approximately76 percent of the turbine fleet hours were accumulated on single engines.
For the ROI simulation, the number of accidents avoided was determined by applying the
anticipated 50% to 80% reduction in the CFIT accident rate. This accident rate reduction
was based on the 50% reduction achieved in fixed wing operations (FAA, 2011) and
IHST reduction target for rotorcraft accidents of 80% (USJHST, 2010).
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Table 8
Projected Flight Hours and Accidents (2017-2026)

Piston
Turbine- Single
Turbine - Twin

Flight Hours (10^5)
83.66
236.93
75.38

Accidents
46
64
12

ROI Simulation
The goal of the Monte Carlo simulation was to estimate the potential ROI that can
be achieved through the greater adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology. The Monte
Carlo simulation, using the given bounds of variability expressed in the model, was used
to compute the possible values of the ROI (Wang et al., 2012). The ROI was determined
using several variables: (1) the safety costs (CS), (2) the technology adoption costs (CT),
and (3) the number of accidents avoided based on the expected accident rate reduction
(ΔR) between 50 and 80 percent. The accidents costs (CA) values randomly generated
from the defined range were multiplied with the number of accidents avoided to calculate
the CS values within the simulation model. The accident rate was considered to be
uncontrollable as it could vary randomly over the 10-year period to get to the targeted 50
to 80% reduction. The CA, as previously shown in Figure 11, exhibits an exponential
distribution. The simulation results were calculated using the minimum to maximum
values of the frequency distribution of the uncontrollable CA and CT variables, with the
assumption that each value was reasonably expected to occur. For the simulation, the
technology adoption costs (CT) estimates were based on the assumed percentage of
aircraft in the respective fleet that would have been retrofitted with the technology by the
year 2026. For the simulation, a range of 25 to 75 percent of the fleet was considered
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with the understanding that some of the fielded aircraft may already have the technology,
and, inversely, not all operators will choose to adopt the technology based on financial or
operational considerations. This was reflected by the fact the equipment considered for
adoption was not standard equipment on the rotorcraft but offered as an option kit or
installed under supplemental type certificate by third party vendors. The cost and fleet
values used in the simulation are shown in Table 9 and Table 10, respectively.

Table 9
Aircraft Accident Costs (CA) and Technology Adoption (CT) Simulation Value.
A/C Type
Piston
Turbine - Single
Turbine - Twin

CA
Mean
Min
$15,023,672 $220,120
$22,381,263 $2,392,200
$43,060,528 $3,254,920

Max
$75,989,080
$98,965,080
$86,605,040

SD
$19,218,693
$26,221,629
$33,795,203

CT
$22,469

$9,946

$29,847

$6,610

Table 10
Projected Rotorcraft Fleet Flight Hours (2017- 2026) and Fleet Size (2026)
Flight Hours
25% of
50% of
75% of
Fleet 2026
(10^5)
Fleet
Fleet
Fleet
83.66
Piston
4170
1043
2085
3128
236.93
Turbine - Single
7036
1759
3518
5277
75.38
Turbine - Twin
2149
537
1075
1612
Note. FAA forecast provides one value for the turbine fleet (9,185 aircraft for 2026).
Single and twin turbine totals are estimated on historical ratios where singles are
approximately 76% of the turbine fleet.
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To calculate the estimated monetary costs and benefits operators should expect
with the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology, the ROI formula, ROI =
[CS – CT] / CT, was applied. The ROI is a ratio of the difference between the accident
costs avoided through accident reduction and the costs expected to be incurred to avoid
them, considered the net benefits, and the same costs to be incurred. The expected costs
were estimated as the technology adoption costs (CT) likely to be incurred when the
CFIT-avoidance equipment is installed in 25 to 75 percent of the fleet. The benefits were
estimated as the safety costs (CS) likely to be avoided with the reduction in the number of
accidents. In the simulation model, the CS values were calculated by multiplying the
accident costs (CA) by the number of accidents avoided. The number of accidents
avoided (ΔR) were calculated by multiplying the current accident rate, projected flight
hours for the period 2016 through 2027, and projected accident rate reduction percentage.
The overall benefits were expressed as the ROI value for each scenario or iteration. As
an example, the piston category current accident rate of 0.56 was multiplied with the
randomly selected percentage reduction rate to calculate the number of accidents avoided
(ΔR). This value was then multiplied with a randomly selected value of accident costs
incurred for each accident (CA) to calculate the overall rotorcraft safety costs (CS) that
would have been incurred for those accidents. In the simulation, a random value with the
range of technology costs, CT, was selected and multiplied with the estimated number of
rotorcrafts within the fleet retrofitted with the CFIT-avoidance equipment. The ROI
formula was coded in the last column to record the values for each iteration. A view of
the simulation model setup with a sample of the ROI results for the piston category is
shown in Table 11.
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Table 11
ROI Monte Carlo Simulation Setup and Sample of Results
FHsa
CSb
CTb
CA
Accident Rate ΔR
ROI
$37,963,200
83.66
0.56
12
$450
$29
15
$28,460,547
83.66
0.56
20
$556
$76
6
$8,525,129
83.66
0.56
23
$195
$24
7
$32,732,306
83.66
0.56
19
$610
$72
7
$47,376,984
83.66
0.56
10
$467
$75
5
$1,137,113
83.66
0.56
21
$24
$23
0
$9,481,187
83.66
0.56
21
$198
$54
3
$61,823,925
83.66
0.56
11
$708
$29
24
$53,814,716
83.66
0.56
21
$1,115
$61
17
$69,708,281
83.66
0.56
14
$943
$50
18
$68,373,795
83.66
0.56
15
$1,048
$22
46
$34,752,143
83.66
0.56
12
$425
$60
6
$47,086,342
83.66
0.56
19
$897
$12
72
$64,001,304
83.66
0.56
11
$697
$46
14
$49,696,442
83.66
0.56
16
$811
$69
11
$17,456,103
83.66
0.56
18
$315
$43
6
$32,776,607
83.66
0.56
12
$400
$36
10
$65,512,358
83.66
0.56
16
$1,066
$62
16
$36,990,792
83.66
0.56
23
$843
$25
32
$6,985,366
83.66
0.56
21
$145
$54
2
$22,814,145
83.66
0.56
13
$306
$27
10
$10,019,442
83.66
0.56
12
$117
$61
1
$16,141,152
83.66
0.56
17
$270
$45
5
a
b
Note. Flight hours (10^5), Costs in Millions, ΔR=number of accidents avoided.

For the simulation to converge to a statistically significant result, 5,000 iterations
of the ROI simulation were performed for each aircraft category. After the simulation
was terminated, the ROI results were analyzed and scatter plots generated. Histograms
with frequencies grouped in bins and box and whisker plots were also generated for
easier visualization and interpretation of the distribution of the potential ROI that can be
achieved. For histograms, the area under each bar or bin reflects the number of
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observations, while box plots, on the other hand, work with densities instead of
frequencies or proportions with the area in the boxplot representing how dense the
observations are within that interval. The same number of observations in the histogram
are represented in a larger or smaller area in the boxplot (Bakker, Biehler & Konold,
2005). Boxplots are also used to identify five key measurements: the smallest value, the
first or lower quartile Q1, the median, the upper or third quartile Q3 and the largest value,
while also identifying extreme values and outliers in a data set (Abuzaid & Mohamed &
Hussin, 2012). According to Hubert and Vandervieren (2008), boxplots provide
information on the location, spread, skewness, and outliers of the data, and therefore the
industry can get a good understanding of the potential ROI that can be achieved.
The ROI value in each iteration is a representation of the benefits likely to
experienced when a given number of rotorcraft accidents are avoided with the adoption
of the CFIT-avoidance technology. With the benefits and costs having the same
monetary unit of measure, the resulting ROI value does not have a unit of measure. The
ROI values in this study were interpreted as the accident costs in U.S. dollars that are
likely to be avoided for every U.S. $1 invested in adopting the CFIT-avoidance
technology. The results showed that a positive ROI would be achieved for each aircraft
category except for the twin turbines, under certain conditions.
Piston category. The piston ROI scatter plot in Figure 13 shows that the
adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology provides a positive return on investment for
the industry with values densely populated between zero and 40. As the ROI values go
above 40, they become more scattered and become sparse above 60. This scattering was
a result of the safety costs being relatively high, an indication of multiple deaths and
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complete loss of the airframe, with a relatively low investment on installing the CFITavoidance technology.

Figure 13. Piston ROI scatter plot.

The scatter plot in Figure 13 show that a positive ROI is likely to be achieved in
most iterations but does not identify which ROI values are consistently observed. To
facilitate this assessment, the histogram was generated. Results from multiple runs of the
simulation indicated that the ROI values will consistently be grouped within a bin with an
approximate of size 3, but the frequencies will vary. The frequency represents the
number of times the simulation will result in an ROI value within that given bin. For this
iteration, the values within the bins below 21 were found to have a frequency ranging
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from 371 to 574. Additionally, on all iterations, at least 53% of all ROI values were
found to lie between zero and the median value of 14, as indicated with the red line and
bin locations in Figure 14. The bin with values between 2 and 5 represents the range
within which most of the estimated potential ROI values lie. The distribution was
skewed right with a long tail of ROI values in the 123 to 126 bin which are considered to
be outliers.

Figure 14. Piston ROI histogram.

Though scatter plots and histograms are valuable in displaying the distribution of the ROI
values, it is important to understand which ROI values are most likely to be achieved in
order to support decision making by the industry. To better understand the distribution of
the ROI values, a boxplot was generated.
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From the boxplot in Figure 15, the relatively narrower spread of values below the
median, shown by the line within the box, than those above it, indicates that the data is
skewed to the right and has a median value of 14. With a first quartile (Q1) value of 6
(indicated by the lower edge of the box) and third quartile (Q3) value of 24 (indicated by
the upper edge of the box), the interquartile range (IQR) is 18. The IQR is defined as the
range within which the middle 50 percent of the data will lie and is an indicator of the
variability of the ROI values. Values above the upper and lower fences are considered to
be outliers. To determine the location of the fence (whisker), the IQR is multiplied by the
standard constant k = 1.5 (Frigge, Hoaglin, & Iglewicz, 1989) and marked from the first
or third quartile, as applicable. With the data being skewed, values above 51 at the upper
fence were determined to be outliers. It was observed that the resulting box plot was
narrow in nature, an indication that the resulting ROI values would exhibit less spread
and be closer to the median of 14. The high ROI values were achieved by having high
safety costs that could be avoided with a reduction in the accident rate versus the costs of
the technology.
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Figure 15. Piston category ROI boxplot.

Turbine-singles. The simulation was also performed for the turbine-single
rotorcraft. A scatter plot of the results in Figure 16 shows that higher ROI values can be
achieved than in the piston category, with values being densely populated between zero
and 40. As the ROI increases, the values become sparser with few exceeding 80. The
high ROI values reflect the high accident costs avoided relative to the technology
adoption costs. The turbine singles are expected to have higher safety costs based on the
seating capacity and value of the airframe.
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Figure 16. Turbine single ROI scatter plot.

A histogram of the results was generated with the values grouped into bins with
an approximate size of 4. The bins with values below the median value of 19, indicated
by the red line, were found to hold 53% of all ROI values, with each bin containing at
least 500 values, as shown in Figure 17. In this simulation, the 8 to 12 bin represents the
range within which most of the estimated potential ROI values lie, with 564. The
distribution of the ROI values was skewed right with lower ROI values occurring at a
higher frequency and a long tail of ROI values above 71 in bins with a frequency of less
than 50. The potential ROI that could be achieved in this category is comparable to the
piston rotorcraft category, as they had the higher number of accidents that could be
avoided while the cost of the technology remains relatively the same.
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Figure 17. Turbine single ROI histogram.

With the frequency with which the ROI values are likely to be achieved now
known, a boxplot was generated. From the boxplot in Figure 18, it was observed that the
relatively narrower spread of values below the median of 19 than those above it, indicates
that the data is skewed to the right. With a first quartile (Q1) of 9 and third quartile (Q3)
value of 33, the interquartile range (IQR) is 24. The IQR showed that the middle 50% of
the turbine-single ROI values exhibited a larger spread than in the piston category, and
therefore operators are more likely to achieve an ROI. Values above 68, or the upper
fence, equal to Q3 plus 1.5 times the IQR were determined to be outliers. These are ROI
values that are possible but unlikely to be achieved. The high range was a result of the
cost of installing the technology being significantly lower than the accidents costs
avoided for multiple fatalities in a single turbine rotorcraft. This boxplot, in the same
manner as the piston category boxplot, was narrow, indicating that the ROI values would
be densely populated around the median at 19 and close to the average ROI. The
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potential ROI values from the boxplot show that an accident rate reduction of 50% would
put the industry in positive territory.

Figure 18. Turbine single ROI boxplot.

Turbine-twins. The simulation was performed for the third category, the turbinetwin, and the ROI values were used to generate the scatter plot shown in Figure 19. In a
similar manner to the piston and turbine-single categories, the lower ROI values were
densely populated and became sparse as the value increased. ROI values were dense
below 5 but began to become sparse above 10, with very few values above 20. A closer
look at the ROI values showed that the costs for retrofitting the CFIT-avoidance
equipment into the rotorcraft (CT) would be relatively high compared to the costs likely
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to be avoided with a reduction in the number of accidents. The turbine-twin category, by
virtue of having the lowest number of accidents during the period of interest, would have
lower costs to be avoided compared to the costs to retrofit most of the rotorcraft fleet.

Figure 19. Turbine-twin ROI scatter plot.

To get a better understanding of the distribution, a histogram of the results was
generated with the values grouped into bins, 1 in size. The bins with values below the
median value of 3, indicated again by the red line, were found to hold over 55% of all
ROI values with each bin containing at least 490 values, as shown in Figure 20. The
frequencies in these bins ranged from 490 to 607. The 0 to 1 bin represents the range
within which most of the estimated potential ROI values lie with 607. The histogram
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shows the data was skewed right with ROI values as high as 23 being realized at a very
low frequency.

Figure 20. Turbine-twin ROI histogram.

To determine the ROI values that are more likely to be achieved, a boxplot was
generated. The boxplot in Figure 21, like the previous boxplots, shows a relatively
narrow spread of values below the median line than those above it, an indication that the
data is also skewed to the right and had a median value of 3. The ROI value for the first
quartile (Q1) was 1 and third quartile (Q3) was 6. The interquartile range (IQR) was
therefore 5. With the data being skewed, values above 12 on the upper whisker, equal to
IQR*1.5 plus Q3, were considered to be outliers. This was determined to be the category
in which under certain scenarios a positive ROI is more likely not to be achieved as the
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Q1 value (1) is close to zero. The lower fence (whisker) value of -1 is considered an
outlier but indicates the possibility of higher losses still exists.

Figure 21. Turbine-twin ROI boxplot.

The results of the three ROI simulations showed positive ROI in most conditions.
Consideration was therefore given to the ROI if the CFIT-avoidance technology was
adopted broadly across all rotorcraft categories. This simulation did not factor in the
reason for adoption, whether voluntary or due to the regulations introduced by the
regulatory authorities. This simulation provided insight as to whether the industry would
experience better returns if the adoption was targeted by all categories simultaneously.
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The simulation was run, and the resulting ROI values were used to generate the scatter
plot shown in Figure 22. The ROI values were densely populated below 20 and became
increasingly sparse too.

Figure 22. All rotorcraft ROI scatter plot.

A histogram of the results was generated and the values grouped into bins with a
size of 1. The bins with values below the median value of 5, indicated again by the red
line, held over 55% of all ROI values with each bin containing at least 490 values, as
shown in Figure 23. The bin with values between 0 and 2 represents the range within
which most of the potential ROI values lie with 602. The histogram shows the data was
skewed to the right with ROI values as high as 47 being realized with a low frequency.
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Figure 23. All rotorcraft ROI histogram.

The boxplot in Figure 24, again shows a relatively narrower spread of values below the
median than those above it, which indicates that the data is also skewed to the right with a
median value of 5. The ROI value for Q1 was 2 and Q3, 9. The interquartile range
(IQR) was therefore 7. With the data being skewed, values above 19 or 1.5*IQR+Q3 on
the upper whisker were considered to be outliers. The average of the ROI value was 6
and a range of 49. The average and median ROI values were seen to be close, and the
industry should therefore expect the likely outcome to be close to those values. As an
outlier and unlikely outcome, a negative ROI can be achieved as indicated at the lower
fence (whisker) value of -1. These value are driven by the high technology costs when
the number of accidents, and therefore accident costs, avoided are low.
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Figure 24. All rotorcraft ROI boxplot.

According to Tang (2006), the opinion of leaders and stakeholders and the
existing socio-economic conditions will impact the adoption of new safety technology.
Since the technology has to be integrated into the existing fleet (older rotorcraft) as well
as the new rotorcraft where the equipment is not installed as standard equipment, the
technology adoption costs are critical, especially for the piston category rotorcraft which
are on the lower price range. In 2015, for example, a new R44 Beta II was priced at
$456,000 and a R22 Beta II at $285,000 (HeliVaue$, Inc., 2015). To understand the
margin available for the existing fleet, the technology adoption costs were increased
tenfold to a minimum of $99,460 and maximum of $298,468, and the simulation with all
rotorcraft considered was performed. A boxplot of the results, shown in Figure 25, was
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generated. The potential ROI values had a median of -0.4, a Q1 of -0.7, a Q3 of 0, and an
IQR of 0.7. The ROI values were skewed to the right as evidenced by the wider spread
of the values above the median. The average of the ROI value and the outliers, indicated by
the lower and upper fences (whiskers), were 1.1 and -1 respectively. The results show that a
positive ROI is unlikely to be achieved when the increased technology adoption costs
constitute as much as 35% of a new lower capacity piston aircraft such as the R22.

Figure 25. All rotorcraft ROI boxplot with increased technology adoption costs.

The results of the potential ROI values for all the rotorcraft categories were
evaluated and were found to have high ranges (IQRs). A sensitivity analysis was
considered but was not performed as all variables were not controllable. The accident
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costs (CA) for each category were found to have significant variation due to the variance
within each of its individual cost categories, of which none were controllable. The
calculated safety costs (CS) applied in the ROI formula were therefore an uncontrollable
variable as well as the technology adoption costs (CT). Since the two variables were
uncontrollable, the resulting median and high IQR values for the simulation run were
considered representative of the ROI value likely to be achieved by the industry or
operators with the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology.
The most important finding from the ROI simulation for all three categories is the
industry is more likely to achieve a positive ROI with negative ROI values being seen to
be outliers on the boxplots. For a negative ROI or losses to be incurred, the cost of
installing the CFIT-avoidance equipment in the fleet would be significantly higher than
the accident costs avoided. The median ROI for the piston and turbine-single was
significant at 14 and 19 respectively. The twin-turbine category, with a median ROI
value of 3, was seen to have a lower margin for positive return. With regulatory changes
having been introduced to address HAA safety, the number of twin turbine accidents
could reduce by at least 40%, generating a ROI without making the additional push for
the CIFT-avoidance technology adoption by all the operators. This possibility shows the
focus for the industry should be on the piston and turbine-single categories for which a
higher ROI will be achieved when the technology is voluntarily adopted in large
numbers. The main driver of the ROI was the accident costs that could be avoided as
direct costs, of which the loss of aircraft and fatality costs were the majority. The results
showed that even when only the direct costs are considered, the industry is still likely to
experience a positive ROI. When the indirect costs, which were estimated at a 1:1 ratio
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to the direct costs, are individually quantified in the future, the ROI is likely to reduce but
is still a positive return when the CFIT-avoidance technology is broadly adopted. It was
also observed that the ROI could be overstated, based on which direct to indirect costs
ratio is selected. As discussed earlier, the direct to indirect costs ratio in previous research
has varied from as low as 1-to- 4.9 in Willingness-to-Pay approach to as high as 1-to-30
for the International Safety Equipment Association, as recognized by Manuele (2011). By
applying the 1:1 ratio suggested by Manuele (20110 and OSHA (2007), conservative
values of the ROI were determined.
When all categories were considered, the potential ROI was positive largely due
to the accident costs likely to be avoided in the piston and turbine-single categories.
Consideration was given to the impact of higher technology adoption costs up to ten
times the estimated technology adoption costs, and it was determined that the ROI was
more likely to be negative. A repeat of the simulation with lower increases of the
technology costs was used to determine that an increase by any factor greater than three
would result in a negative ROI. It was determined that the rotorcraft industry can
therefore anticipate a positive ROI on the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance
technologies when the technology adoption costs are managed effectively.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The current study estimated the potential ROI that could be achieved if the readily
available CFIT-avoidance technology was to be more broadly adopted by the rotorcraft
industry, resulting in a reduction in the number of accidents and costs that would be
incurred. A review of previous research revealed an existing gap with respect to the
estimation of the benefits for operators and the industry when safety solutions were
implemented. Past research applied the cost benefit analysis with only the social or
public benefits being evaluated. A simulation model applying the ROI formula expressed
as ROI = [CS – CT] / CT, was used. The ROI was defined as the ratio of the difference
between the safety costs likely to be avoided with a reduction in accidents and the technology
costs to be incurred to avoid them and the technology costs. The technology adoption costs
(CT) are to be incurred when the CFIT-avoidance equipment is installed in 25 to 75 percent
of the fleet. The benefits were estimated as the safety costs (CS) likely to be avoided with the
reduction in the number of accidents. In the simulation model, the CS were calculated by
multiplying the accident costs (CA) by the number of accidents avoided. The CA were
evaluated by estimating the different accident costs manifested in rotorcraft accidents. The
number of accidents avoided were calculated by multiplying the current accident rate,
projected flight hours over the 2016-2027 period, and projected accident rate reduction
percentage. The study employed a mixed-methods research design conducted in two

phases.
In the first phase, data was extracted from the NTSB aviation accident database
using key search words associated with CFIT accidents. The accident reports associated
with the records retained for analysis were also retrieved. The cause descriptions
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contained within the accident reports were analyzed to determine whether the accident
was CFIT related and then classified into three Accident Type categories: (1) CFIT, (2)
CFIT-obstacle, and (3) wire strike. The accident reports examined were those in the time
period between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2015. The extracted accident data
were placed in a Microsoft Excel® file and used to calculate the accident costs, both
direct and indirect, associated with the outcomes of each rotorcraft accident for the
applicable rotorcraft categories: piston, turbine-single, and turbine-twin. The direct costs
included: aircraft physical damage, loss of resale value, aircraft loss of use, death and
injuries, and loss of staff. The indirect costs were estimated with a 1:1 ratio of the direct
costs and were considered to cover: search and rescue, accident investigation, third party
losses, loss of investment income, increased insurance, and loss of reputation. In the
second phase, costs associated with the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology were
calculated. The technology adoption costs included: acquisition, installation,
maintenance, and training. With the costs defined, the simulation model was run and the
results documented.
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the results of the study and how the ROI
results may influence decision making in the future for the rotorcraft industry and the
general aviation industry as a whole. The objective of the study was to provide an
alternative method of evaluating the potential benefits of adopting existing and emerging
technologies. Recommendations for future research are also discussed.
Discussion
To address the first research question, the costs likely to be incurred by rotorcraft
operators were calculated in the Excel® spreadsheet with each cost variable identified in
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Table 5 considered. An example of the results is provided in Appendix A. For every
accident, the costs of fatality (CF), injury (CI), pilot replacement (CP), aircraft damage
(CD), loss in resale value (CR), and loss of use (CL) were evaluated. The sum of these
costs was the accident’s direct costs, and the same value was assigned to the indirect
costs (CIN) as the direct and indirect costs were assumed to be incurred at the ratio of 1 to
1. The total accident costs (CA) were primarily driven by the fatality in all categories:
$6.95 million (piston), $9.06 million (turbine-single), and $18.8 million (turbine-twin), as
shown in Table 6. Injury costs were the second highest contributor for the piston
rotorcraft, loss of use costs for turbine-singles, and aircraft damage for turbine-twins.
This observation showed that the size and design of the rotorcraft influences the costs due
to survivability and value of the airframe. Rotorcraft leasing costs were also seen to be
high for turbine-singles and twins. The key takeaway from the accident costs was that
the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology has the potential to reduce fatalities and
their associated costs, which in all rotorcraft categories, exceed the second highest cost
contributor by a factor eight to 24 depending on the category.
For the second research question, the estimated costs and benefits the industry is
likely to experience with the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology were
estimated by applying the ROI formula, ROI = [CS – CT] / CT, where the benefits were
the estimated safety costs (CS) likely to be avoided with the reduction in the number of
accidents, and the costs were the estimated technology adoption costs (CT) likely to be
incurred when the CFIT-avoidance equipment is installed in 25 to 75 percent of the fleet.
The CS was calculated by multiplying the accident costs (CA) by the number of accidents
that would be avoided. The number of accidents avoided was calculated by multiplying
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the accident rate for the period between January 2005 and December 2015 with the
projected flight hours for the ten-year period January 2017 between December 2026 and
the randomly selected 50 to 80 percent reduction in the accident rate. The turbine-single
category with a projection of 64 accidents, and an average CA of $22.38 million was
found to have the highest costs if the technology was not adopted broadly. Assuming
each accident incurred the average CA, the turbine-single fleet would accumulate $1.432
billion in costs, almost twice as much as the piston fleet with $729 million from a
projected 46 accidents. The technology adoption costs, CT, were calculated by summing
the equipment acquisition, installation, maintenance, and training costs for each
equipment that was considered. The total CT was calculated by multiplying a randomly
selected value within the range shown in Table 9 and multiplied by 25 to 75% of the
number of rotorcraft in which the equipment would be installed. The ROI formula was
used to perform 5,000 iterations and the results recorded. Table 11 shows that the CS in
most instances was relatively higher than the CT resulting in high positive ROI values as
shown in the boxplots and histograms in Chapter 4 and discussed herein.
To address the third research question, do the ROI results support the broader
adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology beyond HAA operations, the simulation results
for the three rotorcraft categories were reviewed. The results showed that the rotorcraft
industry is more likely to experience a positive ROI than incurring losses and therefore
support the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology. The value of the ROI was
influenced not only by the possible outcomes of the accident, but also the category of the
rotorcraft, number of accidents likely to occur, and the potential costs of the CFITavoidance equipment. From Table 6, the average fatality cost for any of the three
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rotorcraft categories was over $6.98 million or at least 40% of the total accident costs.
An increase in technology costs by a factor of three was found to result in a negative
ROI.
Return on Investment. The projected ROI is a ratio of the rotorcraft accident
costs that are likely to be avoided when CFIT-avoidance technology is adopted to the
costs to be incurred when the fleet installs and utilizes the associated equipment. The
equipment, that includes radar altimeters and HTAWS/EGPWS, are not always part of
the standard configuration and are therefore provided as optional kits. The location and
size of the bins or class intervals of the potential ROI values below the medians in
Figures 13, 16, and 19 was an indicator that the rotorcraft industry was more likely to
experience a positive outcome when the CFIT-avoidance technology is more broadly
adopted. In each category, over 53% of ROI values lay between zero and their respective
median values of 14 for the piston, 19 for turbine-singles, and 3 for twin-turbines. The
likelihood of a positive ROI was also shown by the concentration of the potential ROI
values around the median with IQR values of 18 for the piston, 24 for turbine-single, and
5 for the twin-turbine, which were higher than the median. The IQR represents the range
in which 50% of the ROI values occur, in this case 2,500 for each rotorcraft category.
Achieving a 25 percent or greater reduction in the CFIT accident rate for all rotorcraft
would be a favorable outcome as the industry would experience a positive ROI with a
median value of 5 and IQR of 7, as shown in Figure 24. This positive ROI for all
rotorcraft would be limited by an increase in the technology adoption costs when inflated
by a factor of more than three. When individual rotorcraft categories were analyzed, the
ROI results boxplots in Figure 14, 17, and 20 showed that while the potential of a loss
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exists, it was still unlikely since the ROI values at or near the lower whisker are
considered outliers. The twin-turbine category had the lowest margin for a positive ROI
due to the high technology adoption costs that are likely to be incurred when retrofitting
the fleet with CFIT-avoidance equipment to reduce an already low number of accidents.
The potential ROI values for the rotorcraft categories, individual or combined,
were considered reasonable based on the results of Canada’s Department of Transport
(2011) analysis of the benefits of mandating an expanded adoption of TAWS equipment.
With estimated costs of $59 million and benefits of $216 million, the estimated ROI,
when the formula is applied, is 2.66. James and Avers (2012), in their research on human
factors safety interventions, demonstrated that a large maintenance organization could
achieve an ROI of 312% over six quarters by delivering fatigue training resulting in and
effecting a reduction of equipment damage and injuries. Huang et al., (2009) based on
2006 injury data, estimated that for every dollar invested in safety for the U.S. private
industry, a return of $4.41 could be achieved. High benefits-to-costs ratios were estimated
for lane departure warning and roll stability control road transport safety systems for Class 7
and 8 trucks at 14.69 to 4.95 and 12.50 to 4.7 respectively (Department of Transport, 2013).
Using the ROI formula applied in the study, the lane departure warning and roll stability
control road transport safety systems provided an ROI of 1.97 and 1.66 respectively. With
median ROI values of 14 for the piston, 19 for turbine-singles, 3 for twin-turbines, and 5 for
all categories combined, the projected ROI values were considered to be reasonable.

Operators of single turbine rotorcraft are projected to experience the highest
increase in the number of CFIT accidents, from 56 to 64, if the accident rate remains
stagnant over the next 10 years through to 2026 (Table 8). This category will have the
largest fleet at 7,036 rotorcrafts and, by maximizing the number of aircraft that have the
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CFIT-avoidance equipment, the industry can generate the highest ROI with a median
value of 19. This high ROI would be driven primarily by the occupant fatality (CF) and
injury costs (CI), with an average of $9.06m and $0.5m likely to be avoided in a higher
capacity rotorcraft. An IQR of 24 of the ROI shown in Figure 17 indicates that there is
room for the technology adoption costs to grow before the industry experiences a
negative ROI. It would therefore be reasonable for the industry to prioritize and
accelerate the adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology by the single turbine rotorcraft
operators. The ROI results show that the accident rate, given in Figure 12, should not
always be the primary deciding factor on which rotorcraft category should be prioritized
for the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology.
From an accident rate perspective, the piston category with the highest rate at 0.56
would have been the category to address. A comparison of the ROI showed that the
piston category offers a lower return with a median ROI value of 14 compared to the
single-turbine’s 19. It was observed that the lost value of the rotorcraft given by aircraft
damage (CD) and the occupant fatality (CF) played a significant role in the lower average
accidents costs for piston aircraft at $15.86 million versus the single turbine at $22.4
million, as shown in Table 9. Single turbines, for example, the Bell 206 and Airbus 350,
have a capacity of four to six occupants while piston rotorcraft such as Robinson R44s
and Hughes 269 have a two to four occupant capacity (Aviation Week Network, 2016).
Even with fewer accidents, the higher number of potential fatalities drives the accident
costs and, conversely, the ROI when avoided. The ROI therefore can be considered a
good indicator for the industry on where the investment would be best prioritized. For
CFIT-avoidance technology, it is the single-turbine rotorcraft.
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It was observed that with a low accident rate of 0.16, the cost of installing CFITavoidance technology on at least 25 percent of the twin engine rotorcraft fleet will not
always result in a positive ROI, as shown in Figure 20. From the simulation results, in
certain conditions, for example, a reduction of less than four accidents, the ROI can be
less than zero (loss). With a Q1 ROI value of 1 (Figure 20), this category has a low band
for generating a positive ROI. Table 8 shows that at the current accident rate, 12 of the
projected fleet of 2,149 twin turbine rotorcraft through 2026 are likely to be involved in a
CFIT accident. Therefore, the cost of installing the technology to reduce the number of
CFIT accidents by only four or 33% cannot be justified by the low ROI. Eight of the 10
twin turbines recorded in the simulation spreadsheet were involved in CFIT accidents
while being used for HAA operations at the time. The requirements introduced by the
FAA with the Advisory Circular AC 135-14B Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations
should suffice in the CFIT accident mitigation for this category of rotorcraft. The
requirements for HAA operations that were addressed include TAWS equipment, pilot
testing, alternate airports, and increased weather minimums (FAA, 2015). The change in
HAA regulations is likely to generate a positive ROI on the twin-turbines prior to
additonal investments by the non-HAA operators. The mandate is likely to reduce the
accidents by over four, the minimum required for a positive ROI.
The potential ROI median and IQR values of 14 and 18 for the piston category
and 19 and 24 for the single turbine rotorcraft, shown in Figures 14 and 17, should
provide the industry with a sizeable risk margin even though each cost category of the
indirect costs associated with the accidents could not be individually determined. The
indirect costs were estimated by applying the 1:1 ratio of direct to indirect costs
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recommended in research by Manuele (2011) and OSHA (2007). These costs are
associated with accident investigations, search and rescue, loss of investment, and loss of
reputation, among others. A decrease in the direct to indirect costs ratio would decrease
the ROI by the same magnitude, and therefore only a simultaneous large increase in
technology costs would cause a significant reduction in the ROI to the critical point of
turning negative.
The results of the potential ROI for each individual category as well as for all
rotorcraft provide support for the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology.
The data show that the equipment, mostly avionics, are reliable, and their maintenance
costs (CM) have a low impact on the technology adoption costs over the life of the aircraft
(Table 7). The range of the technology costs, CT, from $9,946 to $29,468, will give the
operators in any rotorcraft category options on the equipment to install based on their
resources or operational needs and still generate a ROI. A ten-fold increase in the
technology adoption costs resulted in a negative ROI, as shown in Figure 24, when all
categories were considered. Further investigation showed that operators should limit the
increase to no more than three times for a positive financial impact. Based on the ROI,
the industry should determine whether the technology adoption should be prioritized
based on category or FAR operations. The additional requirements put in place for the
HAA and other Part 135 operators, though optional for Part 91 operations, should be
encouraged for the segment.
Accidents. An analysis of the data extracted from the NTSB database was done,
and 112 accident reports were retained for the study. As shown in Figure 6, 88 percent of
the CFIT accidents occurred during VMC operations in which a pilot is required to be
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more attentive of the operational environment and to scan for possible obstacles. This
observation is consistent with the Nall report finding that over 88 percent of both
commercial and non-commercial rotorcraft accidents from 2014 through 2016 occurred
in VMC (Air Safety Institute, 2017a; 2017b). Using the Accident Type category, it was
observed that accidents involving wire-strikes were most prevalent at 48 percent, and
almost all occurred frequently in VMC operations. Pilots were seen to have an initial
awareness of the presence of the wires, and on losing sight of their location, the rotorcraft
wound up in a collision. Those occurring in a VMC environment were a result of the
pilot: (1) failing to maintain adequate clearance during low level operations, (2)
experiencing loss of situation awareness in unfamiliar environment, (3) failing to identify
and arrest the rotorcraft’s descent, and (4) deciding to perform low level flight in low
visibility conditions in mountainous areas, over water, and snow covered terrain.
Accidents that involved collision with terrain were the second highest at 22% with 12 of
them occurring in IMC flight. Inadvertent flight into IMC led to accidents as pilots were
unable to re-establish a visual reference for their flight path thus emphasizing the need to
adopt the CFIT-avoidance equipment broadly.
A review of the rotorcraft involved in the accidents revealed a need to break the
light single category into two, the reciprocating (piston) and turboshaft (turbine)
categories, in order to get a better understanding of the accident cost variations and ROI.
The piston rotorcraft were mostly lower capacity aircraft and were involved in 50% of the
accidents. As shown in Figure 7, the piston accident fleet consisted of Robinson R22s,
R44s, Bell 47s, and Hughes 269C, among others. 34 of these rotorcrafts, or 60%, were
Robinson R22 and R44s, underscoring the popularity of these aircraft for low altitude
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operations such as crop dusting, crop freezing prevention, cherry drying, and film
production. Over 90% of rotorcraft CFIT accidents involve single engine aircraft which,
more often than not, are certified for VMC flight for which pilots are expected to scan
their environment for terrain and other obstacles. Ishihara (2005) had similarly observed
that a high number of HEMS CFIT accidents occurred in VMC conditions. Twin engine
rotorcraft were less likely to be involved in a CFIT accident. The HAI, AHS
International, and GAMA teams in 2015 proposed the modification of Part 27 singleengine IFR certification as a means of addressing the high number of inadvertent flight
into IMC and CFIT accidents (Sandel Avionics, 2012). The ROI results for the piston
and single-turbine rotorcraft, which are mostly certified under Part 27, support the
broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology.
In Figure 8, during the period of interest, it was observed that CFIT accidents
were significantly higher over the first half, averaging 12 accidents per year. In the
second half, the average dropped to nine accidents per year. The years 2008 and 2010
had the highest accidents with 14, and 2008 also had the highest number of twin engine
accidents with 4. As the number of twin engine accidents reduced, the single turboshaft
accidents spiked in 2010 to 11. Between 2010 and 2015, pistons and turboshaft singles
were seen to reverse positions in number of accidents. This reversal could not be
attributed to the variation in the rotorcraft utilization, as the fleet flight hours, as
presented in the FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Year 2011-2031, Table 28 (FAA, 2017),
did not show a significant fluctuation during that period. The projected utilization
between 2017 and 2026 (Table 8) reflects the same consistency, and without broader
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adoption of the technologies, the accident rate will only reflect the impact of the
regulations being implemented for HAA and other Part 135 operations.
Accident costs. As expected in safety, accidents do come with the significant
costs for an operator, organization, or industry. For the rotorcraft industry, CFIT-related
accidents incur an average of nearly $22.38 million in related costs (CA) for the
turboshaft single category which had the highest occurrences. The piston category,
which is more likely to consist of individual and small fleet operators performing aerial
operations and personal travel (Figure 9), the CA averages close to $15.86 million (Table
10). These operators are unlikely to have the bandwidth to bear such heavy losses. For
flight instruction rotorcraft, the costs could be even higher if the student pilot is already a
qualified pilot, as the current CA costs only accounted for the loss of life but not the staff
replacement costs. When the accident rates shown in Figure 11 are put into
consideration, the turbine category is seen as the highest driver of costs due to utilization
and fleet size (Table 10). These two rotorcraft categories represent the best opportunity
for the industry to maximize its ROI by broadly adopting CFIT-avoidance technology.
Aircraft damage and injury costs were also significant for all rotorcraft categories
but were relatively low when compared to fatality costs. The aircraft damage costs
averaged between $104,079 and $1.42 million, while fatality costs averaged between
$7.9 and $18.8 million for all categories (Table 6). The lower aircraft damage costs can
be attributed to 77% of the accidents where rotorcraft experience significant damage and
without being destroyed. The high average of fatality costs indicates that fatalities are the
more likely outcome of CFIT accidents over injuries, and the NTSB has estimated that
this is the outcome in 60 percent of these accidents (Sandel Avionics, 2012).
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Technology costs. In order to generate a positive ROI, the results show that the

CFIT-avoidance technology adoption costs, especially for the piston category operators,
ranging from as low as $9,946 to as high $29,847 (Table 7) should remain relatively low
when compared to the accident costs to be avoided. It should be noted that these costs
could be much higher when different pieces of equipment are integrated into the same
aircraft and if the integration is done by the equipment manufacturer, a vendor, or the
rotorcraft OEM. The GTN 650/750 system with moving maps and HTAWS enabled, as
an example, provides more capability at a higher cost. For piston category rotorcraft, the
radar altimeters, with costs as low as $9.946 (Table 7), would provide the best value for
operators, and having been already been mandated for Part 135 operations (FAA, 2014a;
2015), the possibility of even lower costs exists. The higher equipment maintenance
costs, CM, in Table 7, averaging around $12,000, were primarily driven by the software
updates required over the life of the equipment. The repair or replacement costs were
found to be relatively low as a result of the high average MTBF of the equipment at 7,425
flight hours. The ROI results show that the technology adoption costs ideally should not
increase by more than a factor of three.
An increase in the CT for the CFIT-avoidance technology for the piston and single
turbine categories, even with a positive ROI, could rise to levels that would impact its
rate of integration into the fleet. With the current adoption costs ranging from $9,946 to
$29,847 (Table 7) being increased by a factor of 10, the analysis shows a positive ROI is
unlikely to be achieved (Figure 24). The rise in the costs to a minimum of $99,460 could
become unmanageable as it would represent 35% of the value of a new R22 or 22% of a
new R44 in 2015. In simulations where the technology costs were continuously
increased, it was observed that a positive ROI would not be achieved when the costs
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increased by more than a factor of three. As Tang (2006) suggested in his research, the
adoption of new safety technology is influenced by the opinion of leaders and
stakeholders, and rising or high costs could lead to a negative opinion.
Accident rate. The piston category of rotorcraft had the highest accident rate at
0.56 per 100,000 flight hours over the period of interest (Figure 11) followed by the
single turbine at 0.27. In terms of individual accidents, single turbine was the highest
with 56 against the piston’s 46 (Table 8). Based on the operations identified in Figure 9,
these accident rotorcrafts were mostly used for personal travel, farming activities, and
low altitude observation operations. These operations are undertaken by individuals or
small fleet operators. At the current accident rate, rotorcraft in the piston and single
turbine category are projected to be involved in 46 and 64 accidents respectively, during
the next ten-year period between 2017 and 2026, as shown in Table 8. This shows a
marked increase in the possible single turbine accidents, while piston will remain
relatively flat. Some accidents in the single turbine category, similar to the twin turbine,
will be mitigated with the new requirement for Part 135 rotorcraft to have radio
altimeters, but broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance equipment is still needed to
drastically reduce the overall number of rotorcraft accidents. Twin-turbine rotorcraft
accidents were seen to occur at a lower frequency, 0.16 per 100,000 flight hours (Figure
11) and will increase modestly over the same ten-year period to 12. With the number of
piston and twin-turbine accidents remaining flat or increasing slightly, the industry would
experience similar levels of losses as the previous 10-year period. The increase in singleturbine accidents by 8 and the potential to achieve a positive ROI with a median value of
18 supports the broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance equipment.
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Conclusions
This study was undertaken in order to propose and apply a method of estimating
the potential ROI that can be achieved with the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance
equipment and to determine whether the results supported doing so. The methodology
expanded on work previously done by Cavka & Cokorilo (2012) where they performed a
CBA of aircraft safety based on the A320-200 aircraft. The rotorcraft industry or operators

are more likely to experience a positive ROI in all rotorcraft categories. With a median
value ranging from 3 for the twin-turbines on the lower end and 19 for turbine-singles on
the higher end, the results indicate a positive ROI is more likely to be achieved. Key to
the positive ROI is the management of the technology costs. With 50% of the ROI values
for all rotorcraft being between two and nine, the results are consistent with the expected
2.66 ROI from the estimated costs and benefits of Canada’s Department of Transport
(2011) mandate of the adoption of TAWS equipment. The study therefore supports the
broader adoption of the CFIT-avoidance technology.
The study applied cost categories identified in the ASTER research by the
National Aerospace Laboratory (2001), and it was applicable to accidents involving airline
aircraft. It was observed that there was limited information on rotorcraft accident costs, and
for the study, it was necessary to add comments on how each category would be evaluated
for inclusion into the analysis. For the evaluation of the ROI, it was also observed that some
cost categories would have to be considered societal costs and excluded or covered under
indirect costs since they could not be individually quantified. When commencing the study,
it was concluded that the study would be a starting point for the evaluation of rotorcraft
technology ROI, and future improvements though research would be required.
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This research was performed in order to fill a research gap in the literature
surrounding ROI for safety improvements. Although similar ROI research had been
performed, it focused more on operations than aircraft equipment and technology. The
Network Occupational Safety and Health Group’s software, ROHSEI, is used for health,
safety, and environmental ROI analysis. The FAA and Booze, Allen, Hamilton Consulting

developed the ROI for human factors safety interventions (Johnson and Avers, 2012).
Aviation related research on safety interventions was performed as cost-benefit analyses, and
focus was on societal costs. This research has shown that the industry can use ROI to
evaluate the costs and benefits of a safety intervention and make the decision on whether to
invest in adopting it rather than waiting for a regulatory mandate.

Limitations of the Study
The study had limitations that could not be eliminated from the research design
but were not considered to significantly impact the conclusions drawn from the results of
the analysis. To estimate the technology adoption costs, the size of the fleet that would
need to install the equipment should be known. It was difficult to accurately estimate the
size of the fleet that had already installed the equipment. Regulatory authorities in some
cases drive safety improvements by changing or introducing new rotorcraft certification
and operation requirements to require the adoption of new technology. For example, the
analysis of the accidents by FAR description (Figure 10) showed that 60% of CFIT
related accidents over this period occurred during Part 91 general aviation operations.
The new CFR Part 14 §135.160 radio altimeter for rotorcraft operations rule that came
into effect in April 2017 would not affect all Part 91 operators, and only by their
voluntary installation of the altimeters would their risk of CFIT accidents be minimized
(FAA 2014a, 2014b; 2014c). With the introduction of the altimeter rule, only 11 of the

127
67 aircraft operating under Part 91 would have been required to install the equipment.
Since the actual number of operators that could install the CFIT-avoidance equipment as
part of the new regulations could not be estimated, a range of 25 to 75 percent of the fleet
was used for the simulation. This ensures that the simulation results reflect the potential
ROI values more likely to be achieved.
The estimation of the accident safety costs also posed a limitation. It was
assumed that the costs of adopting the CFIT-avoidance technology could vary over time
and were therefore limited to the time of extraction regardless of the source and method
of extraction. As a key factor to a higher ROI, the CT, which will vary from customer to
customer, are based on the rotorcrafts’ age, rotorcraft variants, avionics architecture,
maintenance costs, and technology compatibility. It was assumed that the technology
could be integrated into all aircraft in their current design or minor modifications would
be required. The results showed that occupant fatality (CF), occupant injury (CI), loss of
use costs (CL), and aircraft damage (CD) costs were the main drivers of the ROI values,
and a moderate fluctuation in the CT would not significantly alter the results. The
available data could not support the estimation of the magnitude of the variation of the CT
based on the current or future fleet. With this limitation in mind, the costs were escalated
to identify a range through which an increase was acceptable before the ROI turned
negative. For every ROI analysis, the researcher will be limited by the available data on
technology costs, especially when multiple types of equipment are considered.
The decision to use a ratio of direct to indirect costs of 1:1 in a similar manner to
previous research done by Manuele (2011) and OSHA (2007) research to estimate the
indirect costs could limit the understanding of how the individual cost categories
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influence the ROI. The lack of data on the average costs for search and rescue, accident
investigations, loss of investment with increased insurance costs, third party damage, and
loss of reputation led to the assumption that direct costs were the major drivers.
Additionally, the loss of baggage category was considered not to be applicable due to the
limited amount of luggage passengers in rotorcrafts are likely to carry which also limits
the scope of the cost categories. In future studies, the researcher should quantify the
costs associated with cargo that may not necessarily be considered baggage such as
offshore supplies, skiing equipment, medical supplies on HAA aircraft, and power line
inspection equipment, all of which are not considered part of the airframe. Quantifying
these costs will improve the quality of the ROI analysis results.
Another limitation of the study was the inability to factor out the impact of other
safety initiatives on CFIT accident reduction. The accident reports did not explicitly state
that the installation of CFIT-avoidance could have prevented the accident, and it was
therefore not possible to estimate what percentage of accidents could be avoided over the
next ten years purely as a result of installing the equipment. Additionally, the study was
limited to the technologies that were recommended by the NLR (2014). The use of other
equipment such as tail rotor cameras to prevent tail rotor strikes was not factored in. For
the study, it was therefore assumed that the recommended equipment would be more
likely to help prevent the accident. The results from the study therefore do not offer
insight into other potential factors that may affect the ROI from an operations
perspective.
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Recommendations
This study was intended to provide a method of estimating the potential ROI that
could be achieved with the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology and
evaluating the same. The study applied accident cost categories originally defined for
large fixed wing or airline category aircraft in the ASTER project report (NLR, 2001)
which acknowledged that the existing methodologies did not allow for effective costbenefit assessment. The report determined that the most significant determinants of
accident costs arising from aircraft accidents and incidents were aircraft damage, deaths
and injuries suffered by occupants, and loss of reputation. The findings from this study
on accident costs were consistent with those of the NLR report with occupant deaths and
injuries and aircraft damage being the main determinants, but rotorcraft leasing costs
were seen to be a more significant contributor than loss of reputation for rotorcrafts. This
suggests that the methodology herein can be applied as a starting point for understanding
the financial implications in terms of ROI for new or existing safety technology. The
methodology should be validated by evaluating the ROI of other initiatives such as safety
management systems, human factors, and automation.
In this study, there were three major implications. First, it was determined early
in the study that there was a need to split the rotorcraft into three categories to get a better
understanding of the ROI results. These categories were: piston, turbine-single, and
turbine-twin. When compared to the study done by Cavka & Cokorilo (2012) for airline
aircraft, only two categories, narrow or wide-body, were required. Using three categories for
this study was not only influenced by the aircraft capacity but also a combination of potential
certification and operational requirements. For the piston and turbine-single rotorcraft, some
of the technology would likely be considered optional kits while on turbine-twins they could
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be offered as part of the standard configuration. Second, it was observed that the evaluation
of certain accident cost categories will be needed. Not all the cost categories were applicable
to rotorcraft accidents and had to be excluded with applicable explanations. As an example,
airport closure costs were excluded as most CFIT accidents do not occur near airports, while
site contamination and clearance were considered societal costs. Additionally, the indirect
costs such as third party damage, loss of reputation, and cost of accident investigation were
estimated using the direct costs. This study suggests that further research into the rotorcraft
accident cost categories and their applicable values is required to fully understand the ROI
likely to be achieved for safety interventions as they are introduced. Third, the study showed
that for the industry, a key factor to a higher ROI was ensuring that the technology adoption
costs, CT, remain low. The CT will vary from customer to customer and for the industry as a
whole based on the rotorcraft fleet’s age, variants, avionics architecture, ease of installation,
maintenance costs, and technology compatibility. The analysis assumed that the technology
could be integrated into all aircraft in their current design or with minor modifications
required. Of importance will be the industry’s ability to ensure that the technology adoption
costs for all operators remains relatively low and within reach of individual or small fleet
operators by developing low cost variants, training methods, and maintenance options.
A review of the ROI results shows that the industry should adopt the CFIT-avoidance
technology more broadly for piston and turbine-single category rotorcraft. Operators may
not need to spend additional resources to reduce the number of CFIT accidents for the twinturbine category. There may be a need to use alternative methods such as improved safety
risk management (SRM) training for crew to further reduce the CFIT accidents. Of the 10
twin turbine accidents, 8 were involved in HAA operations at the time of the accident. The
adoption of the new HAA regulations (FAA, 2014a) should provide a CFIT accident
reduction. For any further reduction beyond HAA operations, SRM training could address
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the operational pitfalls or behavioral traps that the FAA has identified as accident inducing
such as continuing VFR into instrument conditions, Get-There-Itis, and loss of
positional/situational awareness (FAA, 2008; FAA, 2009b). With twin-turbines likely to
experience an ROI with a median value of 2 and IQR of 5 plus the impact of the HAA
regulations, it is recommended that operators will be better served by investing in SRM
training for their crew.
Contribution to the literature. This study, which briefly introduced the background
of how the costs and benefits of aviation safety initiatives have been previously evaluated,
has made several significant contributions to the literature where gaps exist. In previous

research, the CBA methodology, in which the government or public perspective is
considered, was applied. The ROI methodology applied herein goes beyond what has
been done with CBAs for various aviation safety initiatives. It evaluates the costs and
benefits for the industry from an investors’ or operators’ perspective. The methodology
expands on previous research performed by Cavka & Cokorilo (2012), where they
performed a CBA of aircraft safety based on the A320-200 aircraft. The ROI considers
the costs that operators are likely to avoid when a reduction in CFIT accidents is
achieved. The study contributes to rotorcraft research by proposing a method of
estimating rotorcraft accident or safety costs not previously done and provides a
theoretical framework on which future ROI evaluations can be done. The study provides
an understanding of the cost categories that drive rotorcraft accident costs: deaths and
injuries suffered by occupants, aircraft damage, and leasing costs. This was in contrast to
one of the expected drivers for airline aircraft, loss of reputation.
The study also provides a basis on which refinements to the methodology can be
made using current resources such as the Aircraft BlueBook®, HeliValue$, Inc.

132
Helicopter Blue Book, rotorcraft OEMS, regulators, and safety equipment vendors. The
study identifies that indirect costs are difficult to estimate since the data is not publicly
available or it’s difficult for the OEMS and regulators to quantify as they may not always
be involved in all incident and accident investigations. The average cost of accident
investigations for the regulators or OEMs were not quantifiable, but the study used the
direct to indirect costs ratio of 1:1 as a starting point for future research. This study calls
for the examination of similar costs to facilitate future ROI analysis. Additionally, the
use of this methodology as described can provide results that can complement the
findings of a CBA done by the government or industry to support the implementation of
given safety initiatives, for example, the Canadian Department of Transport’s decision to
amend the aviation regulations to facilitate the wider adoption of TAWS (Department of
Transport, 2011).
Another contribution to the literature is that this study utilizes the rotorcraft
categories to provide insight into the potential ROI. Some previous safety studies have
used the type of operations according to the Federal Air Regulations description or by
industry affected. For example, observations on CFIT accidents in the HEMS/HAA
industry by Ishihara (2005) and Part 27 rotorcraft by the HAI, AHS, and GAMA (Sandel
Avionics, 2012). The findings of the study contribute to the literature by showing that
the ROI for a given rotorcraft category may be impacted by the regulations that have
been or are likely to be mandated. It demonstrates that the relationship between the ROI
and mandated regulations for safety initiatives needs to be understood not only by
operational segment but also by rotorcraft category. In this case, the new HAA
regulations with respect to TAWS may potentially reduce the number of accidents, and
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investing in CFIT-avoidance technology beyond HAA operations for twin-turbines may
result in a negative ROI.
Practical implications. The study provides recommendations which will
improve the estimation of the ROI for current and future safety initiatives. The
recommendations are based on the findings of the study which adopted the cost
categories identified in the ASTER project report (NLR,2001). The recommendations
address gaps identified within the analysis.
Improving the methodology. The current study applied accident cost categories
originally defined for large fixed wing or airline category aircraft in the ASTER project
report (NLR, 2001). Cavka & Cokorilo (2012) applied the same categories for a costbenefit assessment on A320 accidents. The NLR report acknowledged that the existing

methodologies did not allow for effective cost-benefit assessment, and therefore the
methodology used in this study should be improved for future studies. Improvements
should be made by determining the applicability of the different cost categories as direct
or indirect costs and the values that should be used. The cost categories may include:
a) Airline costs for delay: For rotorcraft operations where timing is critical
such as HAA, scheduled flights or on-demand taxi, it should be
determined whether the cost impact of delays is high enough to warrant its
inclusion in future ROI analyses. The delay costs include the reallocation
of another aircraft to cover the trip, the management of customers before
alternate aircraft is provided, etc.
b) Loss of baggage: This cost for this study was considered negligible.
Consideration should be given for non-aircraft equipment that is lost such
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as medical bags and supplies for HAA, cargo for off-shore ops, and
chemical spray for agricultural applications. The costs incurred in such
losses can be categorized with loss of baggage for a more accurate model.
c) Search and rescue costs: These costs whether incurred by the operator,
OEMs, or the local emergency services should be quantified for future
research. This study showed that a large percentage of CFIT accidents
occurred in VMC and near land, but for other studies where the majority
of the operations may be offshore or in remote locations, it would be
useful to know the SAR costs.
d) Airline immediate response: When a catastrophic accident occurs, a
rotorcraft operator assists the immediate families, colleagues, and the
members of society where the accident occurred to deal with the
aftermath. Additionally, the operator handles some of the communication
of critical information on how the post-accident events are being handled
to the same individuals and members of the media. This immediate
response comes with additional costs. These should be evaluated by
rotorcraft category for the industry.
e) Costs of accident investigation: Rotorcraft OEMS, operators, and
regulators are usually involved in incident and accident investigations.
The degree of their involvement is based on the outcomes. For example,
OEMs expertise may be required to understand the rotorcraft’s design and
failure modes of a given system. When the occurrence is a minor
accident, the FAA or NTSB may choose to delegate the investigation to
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the OEM or industry experts. For the ROI, the industry should evaluate
the average costs to the OEM or operators to support the investigations for
each rotorcraft category.
f) Loss of reputation: This includes the loss of investment income costs.
Accidents can result in the loss of reputation for the airframe or engine
manufacturer or the operator. When customers view either party as having
an unsafe product or operations, customers will not engage with them.
OEMs should evaluate the financial impact of accidents to their
reputation.
Technology adoption costs. One of the recommendations for the industry was to
ensure that the technology adoption costs, CT, remain relatively low to increase the
likelihood of a positive ROI. The results of the study showed that the CT should not
increase by a factor of more than three. Previous research shows that the adoption of
technology will be driven by some of the exogenous factors identified by Venkatesh,
Thong, and Xu (2012) and Tang (2006) such as the price value, operators’ needs, ease of
integration and use, expected performance of the equipment, and whether other users
recommend the use of the equipment or social influence. The industry or operators will
need to evaluate the different technologies against their operations, the rotorcraft, the
pilots’ proficiency, financial resources, and the level of capabilities they would desire and
adopt which will not increase costs significantly for any category or all rotorcraft. Based
on this factor, the industry should explore ways of reducing or maintaining the
technology costs as low as possible as it will be a key factor for operators.
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Recommendations for Future Research
This research provided a framework for estimating the potential ROI that could be
achieved with the broader adoption of CFIT-avoidance technologies. Future research
should study the accuracy of the model by using safety data for implemented safety
technologies or solutions. For example, the adoption of CFIT-avoidance technology for
fixed wing aircraft or the introduction of a safety management system or quality
assurance maintenance program could be studied and the ROI evaluated. The results
from the estimated and actual ROI achieved will provide a better understanding of how
the methodology can be improved. Additionally, the methodology should be improved to
support the study of a specific category of aircraft. For the study, the methodology was
adopted from Cavka and Cokorilo’s (2012) study of airline aircraft to reflect rotorcraft
accident costs. Future research can focus on quantifying the accident costs associated with
not only general aviation aircraft but both manned and unmanned. This will allow operators,
especially fleet operators, to make a quick assessment on the financial impact of adopting
new or emerging technologies broadly and also evaluate the impact of regulations introduced
by regulators based on their CBA assessment.

The industry should make improvements on the ROI estimation method applied
herein by defining or proposing better processes of estimating rotorcraft accident costs.
In this study, consideration was given to the replacement costs of pilots, but a more
definitive model would require the consideration of other personnel such as law
enforcement officers, flight nurses, news producers, and firefighters, among others, who
may be lost in the accidents. In addition to the staff replacement costs that would be
incurred by the organization, significant amounts of resources will be invested in getting
the new personnel to the same level of experience. Though these individuals may not be

137
in aviation roles, the industry will bear the costs involved in replacing them in their
respective organizations, and the services they provide are likely to become more
expensive. Other costs to the rotorcraft industry such as the organizations’ immediate
response to the accidents, costs of supporting accident investigations led by the NTSB or
FAA, increased cost of insurance due the recurrence of the same type of accidents, and
loss of reputation will need to be defined or estimated. Helicopter accidents, like all
aviation accidents, can have a negative impact to a community especially if the industry
is the primary economic activity. The overall economic impact should also be estimated.
Some of these costs in the study were estimated as indirect costs in a 1:1 ratio to direct
costs based on research previously performed by Manuele (2011) and OSHA (2007).
Having more accurate cost estimates will improve the industry’s understanding of the
financial impact of adopting different technologies and will drive better decision making
and strategic approach to technology development.
The rotorcraft industry should adopt the proposed ROI estimation methodology
and apply it to other safety initiatives. In the same manner that a CBA was performed for
accident safety costs for airline aircraft (Cavka & Cokorilo, 2012), airport security (Stewart
& Mueller, 2013), aviation security (Stewart & Mueller, 2014), and U.K. offshore helicopter
industry (Mitchell, 2006), an ROI can be performed for each safety initiative to help the
industry understand the impact the financial resources proactively invested in safety would
have. Safety investments would therefore be driven by the industry rather than regulations
which may take a longer time to be adopted or implemented. In May 2017, during the
HeliOffshore Conference, Andrea Cicero, the then Managing Director of Babcock Mission
Critical Services, acknowledged that demonstrating a ROI has been historically challenging
due to the need for comprehensive safety and financial data (Cicero, 2017). Though this
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methodology provides a starting point for estimating the ROI, future research should be used
to refine data on the various safety or accident costs, both direct and indirect, and to make it
more accessible to the rest of the industry for analysis. For example, understanding the costs
associated with accident investigations for both the airframe OEMs, operators, and the
regulatory authorities would give a more accurate ROI estimate.
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